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1. Introduction 
1.1. Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to discuss and articulate the history, rationale and objectives of the 
Basel Accords. This paper will discuss in depth the various iterations of the Accords, highlight 
the short comings of each version, and discuss how subsequent versions of the accord have 
sought to rectify these. In light of the release of the most recent iteration of the framework, Basel 
III, this paper will also seek to understand the key drivers of Basel III, the concept of capital and 
risk weighted assets ("RW A"), its components, implementation and the management thereof. 
To build onto this discussion, and in line with the theme of banking regulation and capital 
management, this paper will also touch on the Emerging market regulatory landscape, with a 
view to understand the status quo. For the purpose of this paper; emerging markets is described 
as a country that has some characteristics of a developed market but is not a developed market 
(Subhash, 2006). Further, based on a literature review of discussion papers, we weigh up 
whether any of the iterations of the Basel Accord, specifically the latest version, Basel III, should 
be adopted across the emerging market. In the instance that these accords are adopted or, more 
likely the case, already being adhered to, this paper will look to discuss potential amendments 
required to adopt the Basel accords to suit the Emerging Market. 
1.2. Brief Overview 
There are few areas of regulation linked as closely to broader macroeconomic stability as 
banking regulation. Banks' maintain a privileged position in the global economy, as they are the 
source of efficient payment systems and the financial systems primary source of liquidity. Cohen 
(1986) described banks as providing 'the oil that lubricates the wheels of commerce. To ensure 
that they can continue to perform these vital tasks, banks' must have the resources to weather 
slumps in the economy. This is where capital regulation comes in. Over the last 25 - 30 years, 
capital adequacy requirements have emerged as the leading focus of regulation for maintaining 
the safety and liquidity of banks'. The rationale for holding regulatory capital, comprised 
predominantly of shareholders' equity, and reserves against bank loans, is to provide a buffer 
against unexpected losses and in the process to create a disincentive for participating in excessive 
risky activity. When standards are not stringent enough, banks' will encounter insufficient capital 
to cover losses, following which their liabilities will likely outweigh assets, subsequently 
resulting in bankruptcy. 
Since the early 1980's the international banking environment has become more complex and 
riskier. This is due to the combined effect of financial deregulation, innovations, technological 
advances and rapid integration of the world's financial markets (Sahajwala & Van den Bergh, 
2000). These factors have contributed to changes in the way banks collect, measure and manage 
their risks (Carauana, 2004). The fast track integration of global markets has resulted in the need 
to achieve financial stability through the adoption of common rules regulating the global 
financial system. In the global banking sector, capital regulation can be used to achieve this 
stability. Satisfactory bank capital levels serve as a base for bank growth, cushioning it against 
unforeseen losses which can lead to bank failures (Bank for International Settlements, 2004). It is 
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important to monitor and evaluate business activities of banks' relative to the capital necessary to 
cover the associated risks (Amidu & Hinson, 2006). 
1.2.1. The Basel Accords 
The creation of a committee with the objective of fostering stability in the global banking system, 
to be executed through the prevention of bank failures was established in 1974 following the 
collapse of the Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and Franklin National Bank in the United States. 
This committee, subsequently known as The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision ("BCBS" 
or "Committee") is made up of representatives from Central Banks and prudential regulators of 
more than 25 countries l . 
The original mandate of the Committee was to deal with the regulatory challenge posed by the 
increasing internationalization of banking in the 1970s. The collapse of the German and 
American based banks in 1974 showed that financial crises were no longer confined to one 
country, and that coordinated international action was needed to prevent future crises from 
spilling over borders. The committee, which meets and has its secretariat at the Bank for 
International Settlements ("BIS") in Basel, Switzerland, has no formal authority. Instead, it 
works to develop supervisory standards and promote best practices in the fields of banking and 
finance. These objectives culminated in the 1988 capital accord aimed at fostering stability in the 
global banking system through the prevention of bank failures. This capital framework accord 
was commonly known as Basel 1. 
This framework introduced the first internationally accepted definition of, and a mInimum 
requirement for banks' capital, and addressed the inconsistencies in bank capitalisation. The 
Basel I Accord required that a bank had available as "regulatory capital" (through combinations 
of equity, loan-loss reserves, and subordinated debt) 8.0% of the value of its RWA and asset-
equivalent off-balance-sheet exposures. Simply put, Basel I assessed capital primarily in relation 
to credit risk and addressed other risks only implicitly, essentially loading all regulatory capital 
requirements on measures of credit risk. In 1996 it was amended to take explicit account of 
market risk in trading accounts. 
Basel I's adaptation and implementation occurred rather smoothly in the Basel Committee states. 
Although they were not intended to be included in the Basel I framework, other emerging market 
economies also adopted the Accords recommendations. This was however in contrast to the 
warnings written into Basel I against implementation in industrializing countries. In September 
1998 the Basel Committee announced that it would officially review the 1988 accord with the 
aim of replacing it with more flexible rules. By 1999, nearly all countries, including China, 
Russia, and India, had implemented the Basel I Accord. Advances in managing risks, technology 
and banking markets made the simple approaches of Basel I to become less valuable for a 
number of banking institutions for capital adequacy requirements (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2004). For this reason, there was need to move to a more effective and risk-sensitive 
framework. 
I Members of the BCBS are comprised of: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia. Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Luxembourg. Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States 
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1.2.2. The Basel II Accord 
In response to the banking crises of the early 1990s as well as the above mentioned shortfalls of 
Basel I, the BCBS proposed a new, more comprehensive capital adequacy accord. In June 1999 
the BCBS released its first set of proposals for the new framework. According to the Committee, 
the new accord had the following objectives: (1.) continuing to promote safety and soundness in 
the financial system. As such, the new framework should at least maintain the overall level of 
regulatory capital already in the banking system; (2) continue to enhance competitive equality 
amongst banks'; and (3) constitute a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks. 
After five years of negotiations, industry comments and impact studies, the Committee 
announced it had agreed upon capital adequacy framework, the Basel II Accord. The new accord 
rested on three pillars. Pillar 1: Specifying minimum capital requirements, Pillar 2: Providing 
guidelines on regulatory intervention to national supervisors, and Pillar 3: Created new 
information disclosure standards for banks'. The Basel II framework builds a firm foundation for 
capital regulation, supervision and market discipline to enhance prudent risk management as to 
ultimately achieve financial stability (Bank for International Settlements, 2006). 
As surveys emerged showing the effect of Basel II, it became clear that the accord failed to 
achieve its stated objectives. In so far as the first objective, every Quantitative Impact Study 
("QIS") conducted by the BCBS forecasted large capital reductions relative the levels held under 
Basel I for banks' employing advanced internal ratings based ("A-IRB") approach2. Cognisant of 
the fact that large banks' adopted this approach, overall capital levels in the banking system 
declined3. 
The accord also failed to achieve its second stated objective - the need of continuing to enhance 
the competitive equality amongst banks'. There are clear winners and losers under Basel II. 
Every QIS study showed large financial institutions under the A-IRB approach making 
significant gains on smaller institutions in terms of capital obligations. Under Basel II, larger 
institutions were able to free up capital and reallocate it to more profitable areas, whilst smaller 
banks' unable to implement A-IRB were forced to undergo an alternative process, wherein 
ratings, and required capital levels would be estimated by supervisory and regulatory authorities 
(the"Standard Approach"). This resulted in smaller banks' being required to increase their overall 
capital requirements, which necessitated a reduction in their profitability and subsequently 
resulted in a loss of market share. 
1.2.3. Basel III 
Recent financial crises have unearthed numerous weaknesses in the global regulatory framework 
and in banks' risk management practices. In response, regulatory authorities have considered 
various measures to increase the stability of the financial markets and prevent future negative 
2 An approach that requires that all risk components be calculated internally within a financial institution. In addition to the A-IRB approach estimations, this approach 
allows banks to calculate other risk components such as loss given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD) themselves. These would normally be estimated by 
supervisory authorities. 
1 The 2006 QIS-4 showed that banks employing this approach would experience an average drop in overall capital requirements of 15.5'%, and a median reduction in 
Tier I capital of31 %. 
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impact on the economy. One major focus is on strengthening global capital and liquidity rules. 
According to the BCBS "Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the 
BCBS, to strengthen the regulation, supervision and risk management of the banking sector". 
This iteration of the Basel Accords seeks to improve the banking sector's ability to deal with 
financial and economic stress, improve risk management and strengthen banks' transparency. 
Basel III has been designed to address the weaknesses experienced during the financial crisis the 
world faced in 2008. The intent of the BCBS is to prepare the banking industry for future 
economic downturns. The latest amendments to the framework aim to enhance bank specific 
measures and include macro-prudential regulations to help create a more stable banking sector. 
1.3. Problem Statement 
Following on from the recent banking and liquidity crisis of2007 - 2008, the Emerging market's 
arose relatively unscathed, primarily as a result of more resilient banking industries (Caggiano & 
Calice, 2011). The strength of the banking industry can primarily be attributed to the fundamental 
reforms, which included strengthening the regulatory and supervisory systems to ensure sounder 
and more flexible macroeconomic management framework, instituted across the continents' 
banking sectors during the course of the past decade. 
As the role and importance of emerging markets in the global financial market is expected to 
increase in years to come, and as the prevalence of international financial institutions operating 
within these markets increase, the quantum and complexity of transactions undertaken will 
increase (Caggiano & Calice, 2011). Increased transaction volumes and complexity will call for 
more careful oversight and regulatory controls. 
Whilst the Basel accords were in fact designed to address these very points, the Basel Accords 
were not designed to be implemented in the emerging markets (Balin, 2008). This has, however, 
not detracted multinational banks', which are mandated to adhere to these accords, from 
undertaking business in these emerging markets, nor has this stopped capital hungry states from 
implementing iterations of the accord in order to benefit from cheaper bank financing. 
What this paper aims to address is: 
1. Whether or not multinational banks who undertake business in emerging markets, are 
disadvantaged by their requirements to adhere to the Basel Accords, and 
2. Discuss whether emerging economies, which have adopted the Basel framework, fully 
understand the accords nuances, and if the adoption of the accords have led to unintended 
consequences which adversely affect these economies. Where such unintended consequences 
exist, this paper will also look to suggest means of amending, or adopting the accords to 
better suit an emerging market economy. 
1.4. Overview of Methods Used in This Study 
.. Banking system in which banks provide a wide variety of financial services, including both commercial and investment services, across geographies. 
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In order to understand the underlying principles of the various Basel accords, as well as the 
issues associated with the potential implementation of Basel III, a detailed literature review will 
be undertaken in order to build a firm foundation for the study. This study will leverage off of the 
Basel committee's quantitative impact studies, consultative documents, working papers on the 
topic and other applicable literature in order to obtain a better insight on the concept. In other 
words, this work will rely on secondary data gleaned from a comprehensive literature review, to 
deduce logical recommendations on the way forward. As such this paper will be review of 
literature cum conceptual type study. 
1.5. Organisation of the Study 
To establish a firm understanding of the Basel Accords and to enable debate around the topic of 
whether or not the Basel Accords have met their stated objectives, the rest of this study is 
arranged as follows: Chapter 2 will discuss the history and overview of the two earlier versions 
of the Basel accords - herein we will discuss the thought processes which led to the creation of 
the Accords, their major shortcomings and, and how these shortcomings were seen to be 
addressed by subsequent iterations. Chapter 3 will undertake an in-depth analysis of Basel III 
deconstructing the latest version of the accord to gain an understanding of the key drivers of the 
new accord. This chapter will also detail the major components of the accord and discuss how 
these components are improvements upon and have rectified the shortfalls of Basel II. 
Chapter 4 will discuss, based on the key drivers flagged in Chapter 3, the effect having to adhere 
to the Basel accords has on multinational banks, and how this may translate into a competitive 
disadvantage. It will also investigate how emerging markets, which have already adopted these 
accords, may be experiencing unintended consequences of having to adhere to accords designed 
for developed economies. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarize the key research findings and 
provide recommendation in so far as amending the Basel Accords in the context of emerging 
markets in a way that will ensure that banking problems and shortcomings are met with effective 
regulation which does not result in unintended consequences. 
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2. Overview and history of the Basel accords 
2.1. A brief history of the Basel Committee 
Until the 1970s, banking regulation was confided to the regulatory regimes required in the 
respective banks' country of incorporation. Decisions on how to regulate banks' operating within 
the borders of a country was left at the discretion of the supervisory authorities of said country. 
To a very large extent any existing banking regulation lacked international reach, however this 
changed after the 1974 failure of Herstatt Bank in Germany. 
The concept of banking regulation and capital adequacy requirements can, to an extent, be 
attributed to the management of foreign exchange rate exposure, brought about as a result of 
globalization. We can go further and suggest that the creation of the BCBS was a direct 
consequence of the 1973 breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of managed exchange rates. 
1974 saw the West German Banking Supervisory Office withdraw the banking license of 
Bankhaus Herstatt after finding that the bank's foreign exchange exposure exceeded its capital 
base by close to three times. At the time of Herstatt Bank's closure, several unsettled transactions 
between Herstatt Bank and American banks' remained outstanding. In this case, American 
banks' had paid Herstatt Bank Deutschmarks, but the American banks' had not received the 
dollars owed to them. This resulted in significant losses for the American counterparties. In 
October 1974 the Franklin National Bank of New York also stopped operating; this came about 
after the bank racked up substantial foreign exchange losses. 
These incidents illustrated the risks associated with banking internationally, and underscored the 
importance for collaboration between countries to mitigate the occurrence and minimize the 
impact of future risks in international banking. With the objective of avoiding a reoccurrence of 
the above mentioned bank closures, as well as other financial market disruptions, the Central 
Bank governors of the 10 largest economies, ("G I 0 countries"), established the Committee on 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices. This Committee subsequently became known as 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This newly formed committee was mandated with 
encouraging and facilitating the regular cooperation between the member countries of this 
committee on banking supervisory matters. The strategic intent of the committee was set to 
enhance financial stability, to be brought about by improving the supervisory know-how and the 
quality of banking supervision globally. 
The means in which the Committee sought to achieve its strategic intent was by: 
1. Establishing and enforcing minimum supervisory standards; 
2. Improving the efficiency and effectiveness of these methods for supervlsmg the 
international banking business; and 
3. Sharing information on national supervisory arrangements. 
After starting life as a Gl0 body, in 2009 the BCBS expanded its membership and now includes 
27 jurisdictions. The Committee itself reports to an oversight body, a group of Central Bank 
Governors and Heads of Supervision ("GHOS"), from member countries. 
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The Committee formulates supervisory standards, guidelines and recommends statements of best 
practice with the expectation that national authorities will implement them. The Committee as 
such encourages convergence toward a set of common standards and monitors its 
implementation, without attempting a detailed harmonization of member countries' supervisory 
regimes. It however bears mentioning that adhering to the committee's recommendations are 
discretionary as the Committee's decisions have no legal force. 
At its onset, one of the committee's most important objectives was to narrow the gap In 
international supervisory coverage so as to ensure that: 
1. No foreign bank could escape supervision; and 
2. Supervision would be adequate and consistent across member jurisdictions. 
The first step in meeting this objective was the 1975 paper issued, and which came to be known 
as the Concordat. This Concordat set out the principles to which supervisory responsibility for 
banks' foreign branches, subsidiaries and joint ventures was to be shared between host and parent 
supervisory authorities. In May 1983, the Concordat was revised and re-issued as Principles for 
the supervision of banks' foreign establishments. 
April 1990, saw the issuance of a supplement to the 1983 Concordat. The aim of this supplement 
was to improve the cross-border flow of prudential information between banking supervisors. 
1992 saw certain principles of both the initial and supplemented version of the Concordat being 
reformulated as minimum standards. These standards were communicated to other banking 
supervisory authorities, who were invited to endorse them, and published in July 1992. 
2.2. Importance of Regulating Bank Capital 
As the work of the BCBS continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s, it became clear to the 
Committee that it was imperative that the committee address the issue of capital regulation. In 
summary we can define the purpose of the Basel accords as ensuring that banks' are sufficiently 
and adequately capitalized. However, before an understanding of the capital accords can be 
gained, it is worthwhile that we develop a grasp of the concept of capital. 
2.2.1. Defining capital 
From an accounting perspective banks', like companies, have a balance sheet. These balance 
sheets are comprised of assets, liabilities, and equity. Liabilities represent bank's debt obligations 
and in the case of retails banks' are comprised primarily of deposits. Conversely, banks' assets 
are comprised of facilities extended by these banks, primarily comprised of customer loans. 
These loans give rise to the banks' revenue, which is largely made up of interest charged to 
borrowers. Whilst there exists a range of other items which can be broadly classified as either 
assets or liabilities, the bulk of a bank's assets and liabilities consist of loans and deposits 
respectively. 
When the assets of a bank exceeds' its liabilities, the balance is referred to as the bank's capital, 
or more commonly equity. It is critical that banks' have and maintain a sufficient level of capital 
at its disposal; thus ensuring that banks' are able to service their liabilities as they become due. 
8 
Aside from mitigating the risk of insolvency, capital is especially important to a bank for the 
following reasons: 
• It serves as a buffer and protects against the risk of losses, these losses are inherent in banks' 
assets, which are primarily comprised of loans to customers. 
- Banks' lend money with the expectation that these loans will be serviced, both principal 
along with interest. However failures in so far as the repayments of these loans occur, these 
are termed ("default"). 
- In the event that a default occurs, banks' would lose the money it owes to its depositors, i.e. 
its liabilities, in this instance banks' drawdown on its capital as a means of repaying said 
depositors. 
• It mitigates the impact of volatility on a bank's liabilities. 
- Banks' are primarily funded with customer deposits, liabilities. Deposits can be seen as a 
relatively unstable funding source, given that depositors can demand the bank repay them 
at their discretion. In the instance that depositors make a run on the bank, a portion of the 
reduction in deposits could also be funded with banks' capital. This stems from the 
relatively illiquid nature of the bank's assets, which in most cases have longer tenors. 
- Should withdrawals be substantial enough, banks' may see their capital base completely 
eroded following which it may find itself being classified insolvent. 
Possessing sufficient levels of capital instills confidence in the minds of both banks' depositors, 
as well as its creditors. These capital levels imply that that the bank will be able to service its 
liabilities, even in the event that some of its assets are defaulted on. 
2.3. Development of the accords 
With the impact of globalization spurring international trade, and subsequently increasing 
international flows, member countries of the BeBS sought to address the concern of capital 
regulation from an international perspective, ensuring that individuals, corporates and even 
banks' operating internationally are protected by a set of common capital requirements. These 
capital requirements were especially important during the middle half of the 1980's, as some of 
the most internationally active banks' sought to capitalize on minimal to non-existent capital 
regulation and held minuscule levels of capital. 
It should however be noted that not every nation maintained a lax capital regulation regime. As a 
case in point, during the 1980's the United States of America ("USA" or "US") implemented a 
significantly stricter capital requirement regime. Stability of the US's banking market aside, this 
led to the US putting their banks' at a competitive disadvantage in relation to banks' in other 
countries who were subjected to less cumbersome regulatory regimes. 
With the considerations highlighted above in mind, the Basel committee sought to create and 
implement standards with the objective of harmonizing the regulation pertaining to banks' capital 
across the world. The intention of this harmonized regulation being: 
1. The creation of a safer, international banking landscape; and 
2. The creation of regulation which yields a level competitive landscape for banks' that 
operates in different countries as well as those with multinational operations. 
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The results of the BCBS' work resulted in the creation and implementation of a framework 
entitled the "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards," this 
framework has become more commonly known as the Basel I Capital Accord, or simply Basel I. 
2.4. Basel I: the Basel Capital Accord 
A consensus of a weighted approach to the measurement of risk, both on and off banks' balance 
sheets came about as a result of concerns that the capital ratios of major international banks' were 
deteriorating. These concerns were exacerbated by the mid 1980's Latin American debt crisis5 at 
a time of growing international risks. As a result of the growing international risk awareness, the 
Committee members, backed by the now G 1 0 governors, resolved to halt the erosion of capital 
standards and to work towards greater convergence in the measurement of capital adequacy. 
The Committee recognised the need for a multinational accord which could strengthen the 
stability of the international banking system, and remove the source of competitive inequality 
which arose from differences in national capital requirements. Following comments on a 
consultative paper published in December 1987, a capital measurement system commonly 
referred to as the Basel Capital Accord (or the 1988 Accord) was approved by the G 1 0 
Governors and released to banks' in July 1988. 
The BCBS is a statutory body, and as such has no legally binding authority. As such the adoption 
of the Basel accords are seen to be is largely discretionary. However, even absent any legal 
ramifications, many of the BCBS's member countries, as well as other non -member countries, 
have adopted the Basel I accord, and subsequently incorporated the features of the accord in their 
own regulatory regimes. 
Cognisant that the Committees work was targeted primarily towards banks' involved at an 
international level, the Basel I accord was only intended to be applied to these banks' with cross 
border activities. However, following the release of the accord, many countries have applied 
Basel I's framework to all banks' operating in their jurisdiction on a wholesale basis. 
2.4.1. Features of Basel I 
The Basel I Accord called for the implementation of a minimum capital ("Capital adequacy") 
ratio, wherein the ratio of capital to RW A is set at 8.0%, this ration was meant to be implemented 
by the end of 1992. 
As a means of quantifying capital adequacy, Basel I employed the capital ratio. The capital ratio 
measures the ratio of banks' capital in relation to its assets. It should however be pointed out that 
the value of a banks' assets included within this ratio is not the nominal value of a banks' assets, 
instead the value of the bank's assets were adjusted to reflect their riskiness. These risk adjusted 
5 During the 1960' sand 1970'5 many Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, borrowed large sums of money from international creditors to 
be used on infrastructure programs. These countries had soaring economies at the time so creditors were comfortable to provide loans. Initially, developing countries 
typically garnered loans through public routes like the World Bank After 1973, private banks had an influx of funds from oil-rich countries and believed that 
sovereign debt was a safe investment. 
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assets, are commonly referred to as a banks' RW A. The capital (adequacy) ratio is thus expressed 
as capitallR W A. 
As mentioned above, to be considered sufficiently capitalized the ratio of a bank's capital needs 
to be at least 8.0% of the value ofthe bank's RWA. 
Whilst formulating the capital (adequacy) ratio, the BCBS also sought to define the constituents 
of "capital" from a regulatory perspective. In its broadest terms, capital is defines as banks' 
excess assets over its liabilities. However, as with banks' assets and liabilities, discussed earlier 
in this paper, there are many other items which can be included in capital, some of these items 
are better suited than others to absorb losses. 
Subsequently the BCBS decided in respect of the Basel I accord, the definition of banks' capital 
would be broken down into two components: Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. 
2.4.1.1. Tier 1 Capital: 
Tier 1 Capital is comprised of high quality capital. By higher quality the accord refers to capital 
with a lower priority and likelihood of repayment in the event that a bank was to be declared 
insolvent. Based on the definition above, Tier 1 capital has the greatest ability to absorb losses in 
assets. 
This form of capital is primarily comprised of "core capital" namely, common equity, and 
represents an ownership share in the bank. Tier 1 capital also includes the paid-in value of 
common stock, as well as any reserves such as retained earnings. Items arising from ownership in 
the bank have the lowest priority of repayment in the event of insolvency, and therefore represent 
the highest quality capital. 
As discussed earlier in this paper, in terms of Basel I, banks' must maintain a capital ratio of at 
least 8.0% to be considered sufficiently. However it is important to point out that the Basel I 
Accord requires that at least half of this 8.0%, i.e. 4.0%, of the capital ratio be comprised of Tier 
1 capital (i.e., Tier 1 must equal at least 4.0% of a bank's RWA). 
2.4.1.2. Tier 2 Capital: 
Tier 2 Capital is considered to be less reliable than Tier 1 Capital, and is comprised of items such 
as subordinated debt and reserves held for loan losses. Cognizant the rank and seniority of the 
constituents of Tier 2 Capital, a bank can use the proceeds raised from subordinated debt 
issuances to service more senior ranking liabilities, these liabilities include deposits owed to 
customers. 
While Tier 1 Capital is comprised of unencumbered equity, Tier 2 Capital is permitted to include 
subordinated debt issued by banks'. In light of the fact that these lower priority liabilities are 
included in the definition of capital, it can be seen to be reflective of the financial wellbeing of 
banks' in certain of the BCBS member countries. These banks' were inadequately capitalized 
with bank capital, owner's equity, and instead relied, albeit only partially, on debt. 
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Banks' capital provides a buffer against potential losses, stemming from defaults, in bank's 
assets. Whilst drafting the Basel I accord, the BCBS sought to develop capital adequacy 
guidelines by employing a risk based approach. The committee incorporated the notion that the 
level of capital required to be held by banks' be proportionate to both assets held by the bank, as 
well as the probability of a default associated with the assets held by a bank. 
Simplifying this statement, the BCBS implemented a framework where riskier assets, defined as 
those which possess a higher probability of defaulting, be offset by a requirement to hold higher 
amounts capital against these assets. 
2.4.2. Concept ofRWA 
With the employment of the above mentioned risk based approach under Basel I, the BCBS 
incorporated a risk sensitivity measure into the denominator of the capital ratio calculation. 
Instead of employing a capital ratio which contrasts a bank's capital against the nominal value of 
its assets, Basel I's capital ratio contrasted a banks' capital against the value of bank's risk 
adjusted assets. The risk adjusted denominator of the capital ratio was called banks' risk 
weighted assets. 
As a means of differentiating between the risks inherent in banks assets, the BCBS established 
four risk categories. Banks' assets were segmented into risk buckets, each of these buckets 
defined by a risk weighting, these buckets carried the following risk weightings; 0%, 20%, 50%, 
and 100%. The risk associated with banks' assets dictates the bucket into which these assets 
would fall, this bucket then determines the proportion of that asset's value to be included in the 
bank's RWA calculation. 
Relatively riskier assets, such as loans extended to corporates, are placed in buckets with higher 
risk weightings. This implies that more of the asset's value is included in bank's RWA, which, in 
turn, results in increased capital requirement in order to meet the 8.0% capital requirement. 
These risk weightings are based on the risks inherent in the counterparty involved in the 
transaction. As an illustrative example, facilities extended to Governments of the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") poses no risk of loss to banks'. 
Therefore, under the Basel I Accord facilities extended to governments of the OECD are placed 
in the 0% risk category, as such banks' would not have to include the value of these assets in its 
total RWA. 
Converse to the case of facilities to OECD governments, Basel I considers commercial loans to 
be riskier, as such the accord suggests that these assets be placed in the 100% risk category. With 
the above in mind, 100% of the nominal value of commercial loans is included in the 
denominator of the capital ratio. Below is a chart which further clarifies the risk weighting by 
obligor assumed under Basel I: 
Risk Weighting (%) Assets to include within this Risk Bucket 
0.0 Cash and loans extended to the governments ofOECD countries 
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20.0 
50.0 
100.0 
Assets involving banks' domiciled in OECD member countries, and cash items which are 
in the process of collection 
Loans secured by mortgages on residential property 
Assets involving commercial businesses, consumer loans, and assets involving non-OECD 
governments 
Basel I's determination of capital adequacy also incorporated a process for accounting of the 
risks emanating from items held off banks' balance sheets. When off balance sheet assets become 
items reflected on banks' balance sheets, these assets carry a risk of loss similar to any other 
asset. Recognizing that assets held off balance sheet have this potential for losses, Basel I 
ensured that these types of assets were consolidated into banks' capital ratios. 
Once all assets, on and off balance sheet, were risk adjusted, the corresponding risk adjusted 
values were summed. The product of this calculation equates to banks' RWA. This RWA 
represents the denominator in the Basel 1 accords Capital Ratio. 
2.4.3. Drawbacks of Basel I 
This accord can be seen to be the first coordinated, international, attempt at regulating bank 
capital. Whilst the accord was largely accepted and implemented by both members and non-
member countires of the BCBS, the Basel I Accord was also the subject of substantial criticism. 
Amongst the biggest criticisms of the accord was that the framework was almost solely focused 
on credit risk. Other areas of contention focused around the frameworks inability to adequately 
reflect the actual risks borne by banks', the failure to consider and take into account other risk 
exposures such as market risk, and the view that the risk weightings assumed under the Basel I 
accord was inadequate. 
In January 1996, following various consultations with stakeholders, the Committee issued a set 
of amendments to the accord, this saw the introduction of market risk into the weighting of asset 
classes. A key feature of this amendment is that, subject to strict regulatory standards and 
supervision, banks' was permitted to employ internal risk valuation models and techniques as a 
basis for measuring their market risks and exposure when determining capital requirements. 
Aside from the failure to take into account other types of risk, substantial criticism was also 
directed to the Basel I asset bucketing approach. Opponents of the framework viewed Basel I's 
bucket approach to risk weighting assets as subjective, broad, and insufficiently sensitive to the 
bespoke risks associated the assets held by banks'. Put into context, within each bucket, there are 
assets with very different levels of risk, but because they all share a common type of counterparty 
they were assumed to possess the same type of risk. 
As a means of illustrating the criticism of Basel I's approach to RWA, we should consider the 
case of commercial loans. Under Basel I, commercial loans are risk weighted at 100%. The 
critique stems from the fact that whilst commercial loans counterparties are treated uniformly 
from an R W A perspective, each of these counterparties has a unique risk profile. A loan to an 
established corporate is less risky from a credit risk perspective, that a loan to a startup company. 
Whilst credit profiles of the corporates mentioned above may differ vastly, from a R W A, and 
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consequently capital adequacy perspective the corporates are treated similarly. This uniform 
R W A treatment resulted in banks' engaging in regulatory arbitrage. 
From a regulatory perspective, it is inconsequential whether banks' lend to start-up or established 
corporates, according to Basel I's risk weightings, banks' have to include 100% of the loan in its 
R W A calculation (King and Tarbert, 2011). Considering this dichotomy from a profit making 
perspective, loans to start-up corporates are riskier; this risk premium however attracts higher 
pricing. Banks' are profit driven, and are such incentivized to make loans to riskier corporates 
where it earns more profit. By pursuing the highest earning potential, maximising profits 
increases risk, this leads to a situation where the level of capital required under the Basel I 
methodology is insufficiently commensurate with the risk inherent in banks' assets. 
As criticisms of Basel I mounted, BCBS member countries concluded that reforms were 
required. Following years of stakeholder engagements and consultations, the BCBS released a set 
of revisions to the Basel I Accord, entitled "International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework". This revised framework has come to be known 
as ("Basel II"). 
2.5. Basel II: the New Capital Framework 
In 1999 the BCBS issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework slated to replace the 
relatively outdated 1988 Accord. This led to the June 2004 release of Basel II Accord. The Basel 
II Accord was organized around three (3) central pillars, referred to as the "Three Pillar" 
approach. These pillars are as follows: 
I. Minimum Capital Requirements: This pillar sought to further develop and expand upon 
the standardised rules set in the 1988 Basel I Accord; 
2. Supervisory Review: A newly introduced pillar setting out the capital adequacy and 
internal assessment procedures6 to be followed by banking institutions; and 
3. Market Disclosure: Another newly introduced pillar which sought effective disclosure as 
a lever to strengthening market discipline and encouraging sound banking practices7. 
The minimum capital requirement pillar attempted to specifically redress the deficiencies 
identified in Basel I. Pillars II and III sought to deal with supervisory review standards and 
market discipline issues. 
The publication of the Basel II framework in 2004 followed six years of preparation wherein the 
BCBS consulted, on an extensive basis, with banking sector representatives, supervisory 
agencies, central banks', and outside observers. Ultimately the objective was to develop a 
substantially more risk-sensitive capital accord. 
6 Pillar two encourages banks to develop their own risk management strategies, based on sound capital assessments and a comprehensive assessment of risks subject to 
each bank's specific situation. Pillar two also codifies the expectation of regulators that banks will strive not only to meet, but ultimately to surpass, the minimum 
capital requirements outlined in pillar one. Finally, pillar two emphasizes the direct role of bank boards of directors and senior management in ensuring Basel II's 
compliance. 
7 Pillar three aims to increase market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements intended to allow market participants to assess key pieces of 
infonnation on the capital adequacy of a bank. In enabling a more accurate assessment of each bank's activities by market participants, regulators had hoped that the 
market would reward those prudently managing their risks while penalizing banks with less robust risk management. 
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2.5.1. Pillar 1, addressing the short comings of Basel I 
Similar in nature to the first iteration of the Basel accords, Basel II required banks' to maintain a 
capital ratio equal to at least 8.0% ofRWA. The framework assessed banks' capital adequacy by 
employing the same capital adequacy ratio as Basel I, with no further amendments to the 
definition of capital. In terms of the Basel II Accord the bulk of the emphasis was focused on 
Pillar I, more specifically the denominator of the capital ratio equation, i.e. the calculation of 
RWA. 
Pillar I was redesigned with the intention of addressing the deficiencies of Basel I, to better 
reflect the underlying risks of banks' assets, and to better address the financial innovation which 
occurred between the release of Basel I, and II. 
With the above in mind, the primary objective of this pillar was to ensure that the calculation of 
risk in banks assets more accurately reflects the risk inherent in these assets. As a means of 
achieving this objective, the Basel II Accord saw the inclusion of a reformed method for 
measuring credit risk. When banks' assets are fully reflective of its risks, there occurs a reduction 
in the occurrence and incentives for banks' to engage in regulatory arbitrage. This was identified 
as one of the major criticisms of Basel I. 
Basel II's amended pillar I employed the following approaches of measuring credit risk: 
1. The Standardized Approach; 
2. The Foundation Internal Ratings-Based Approach ("F-IRB"); and 
3. The Advanced Internal Ratings-Based Approach. 
The Basel II accord offered an array of options for determining banks' credit risk. 
2.5.1.1. The Standardized Approach: 
Basel II's Standardised approach shares numerous similarities with Basel I's approach to risk 
weighting assets. Given its similarities with Basel I, the Standardized Approach is the least 
complex of Pillar I's three approaches to implement. As was the case with Basel I, this approach 
retains the use of risk buckets for determining an asset's risk adjusted value. 
Contrary to Basel I, the Standardized Approach differs from the initial accord in the following 
ways. 
1. The Standardized Approach sees the number of risk buckets expanded from four to six. 
- This Approach saw the introduction of a 150%, and 35% risk bucket. 
2. The process of determining the buckets in which banks' assets are placed. 
- Basel I saw assets being placed in risk buckets premised on the counterparty involved. 
With the knowledge that no two counterparties bear an identical risk profile, the 
Standardized Approach premises its risk weighting on the unique risk associated with 
each of the bank's assets. 
- Basel II's Standardized Approach facilitates this risk weighting approach by 
leveraging off credit rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor's ("S&P), Moody's and 
Fitch. 
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With the Standardized Approach, assets are assigned to risk buckets based on the credit rating 
assigned to the banks' counterparties; higher rated counterparties being assigned to lower risk 
buckets and vice versa. 
The implications of this updated framework can be seen when we consider the example of a 
commercial borrower, rated AAA by S&P, in terms of Basel II, this asset would be placed in the 
20% risk bucket. In contrast, under the Basel I Accord all commercial loans, irrespective of their 
credit worthiness, would be placed in the 100% risk bucket. 
How an asset is risk weighted is subject to both an assets credit rating, as well as whether the 
asset is representative of a claim on a sovereign government. This is reflective of the notion that 
assets extended to government poses less risk. All things equal, the standardized approach places 
government assets in a lower risk category than a similar asset with a claim on a private party. 
Tabulated below are examples of the risk-weightings premised on credit ratings (S&P's ratings 
scale) and contrasted between claims on governments and private counterparties. 
Credit Rating (S&P) 
AAA toAA-
A+ to A-
BBB+to BB-
Below BB-
Unrated 
Government Risk-Weighting 
0% 
20% 
50% 
150% 
100% 
Private Counterparty Risk-weighting 
20% 
50% 
100% 
150% 
100% 
This does not take into consideration the 35% risk category. This is because the category is 
reserved exclusively for loans secured by residential mortgages. Such assets are automatically 
included within this category irrespective of credit rating. 
The Standardized Approach is seen as the easiest methodology to employ when calculating credit 
risk. Given the relative ease of implementation, it is recommended that this approach be 
implemented by smaller banks' adopting Basel II. 
The other approaches, FIRB and AIRB, are recommended for implementation in larger, more 
sophisticated banking institutions. The biggest difference between the standardized and two 
Internal Ratings Based ("IRB") is that the IRB approach, as the name suggests, allows banks' to 
employ proprietary methodologies in the determination of the risk level of their assets. In 
contrasts, the Standardized Approach requires banks' to rely on the external ratings to risk weight 
their assets. 
Given the sophisticated nature of the IRB approaches, where banks' seek to employ either of the 
IRB approaches, banks' are required to demonstrate their technical ability to implement these 
approaches and are required to receive approval from regulators. 
2.5.1.2. Internal based ratings approach 
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Expected loss is a concept underpinning both IRB approaches. Losses in assets are a normal part 
of the banking business. Banks' are able to forecast and prepare for losses by analysing and 
interpreting historical probabilities of defaults, and losses. Instances exist where a bank incurs 
losses greater than forecast. These above average loss levels are termed banks unexpected losses. 
Unexpected losses are employed in the estimation of banks' credit risk, these credit risk 
estimations informs the determination capital levels banks' should maintain. 
As the name suggests expected losses are expected, given the expectation that these losses will 
materialise, banks' set aside reserves, such as loan loss reserves, with the objective of absorbing 
these expected losses. With expected losses cushioned by banks' reserves, bank capital is meant 
to cushion against unexpected losses. As a means of estimating unexpected losses, four inputs 
are employed, all of which are common to both IRB approaches. 
1. Probability of Default ("PD"). This input yields an estimate of the probability, on an 
annual basis, that a borrower will default on its obligation to service a loan. 
2. Loss Given Default ("LGD"). This input provides an estimate of the losses a bank may 
incur in the event that a borrower defaults. 
3. Exposure at Default ("EAD"). This input represents the total exposure banks' have 
extended to a specific borrower. This is the amount banks' stands to lose at the time of a 
default. 
4. Effective Maturity ("EM") of the asset. The longer the tenor of a loan, all things being 
equal, the greater the probability of a default occurring. 
Once these inputs are computed for banks' individual assets, these inputs are fed into 
mathematical estimation computations; these computations yield the estimates of banks' 
unexpected losses. In terms of the Basel II accord, banks' must ensure that they possess capital 
equal to at least 8.0% of this unexpected loss amount. 
2.5.1.3. Differences between the FIRB and the AIRB approaches 
The difference between the FIRB and AIRB approaches stems from who determines the values 
of these inputs. 
• In terms of regard to the FIRB approach, banks' are only allowed to calculate the PD of their 
assets. The values of LGD and EAD are determined by banks' regulators. Furthermore, while 
regulators retain the discretion to assign the EM input, banks' are allowed to apply its own 
calculation. 
• In contrast to the FIRB approach, under the AIRB approach banks' are allowed to calculate 
values for all of its inputs. 
Whether banks' employ the FIRB or AIRB approaches, both the risk calculation methodology 
and its resultant outputs must be reviewed and verified by banks' regulators. Therefore it can be 
seen that the Basel II Accord allows banks' a degree of autonomy when estimating credit risk. 
Irrespective of the methodologies employed to measure the credit risk inherent in a banks' assets, 
the output of these calculation are used to determine the proportion of the underlying assets value 
that will be included in banks' RWA. 
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2.5.2. Pillar 2: Supervisory review 
Pillar 2 of the Basel II Accord is a discretionary element of regulation; this Pillar is premised 
upon an assessment of the supervisory functions within the bank. In particular, Pillar 2 assesses 
the extent of internal control procedures within banks'. 
This supervisory review process seeks to ensure that banks' have capital levels sufficient to 
support the risks inherent in their business, as well as encouraging banks' to develop and use 
better risk management techniques in the management of their risks. 
Pillar 2 is comprised of two elements: 
1. The discretion of regulators to impose additional capital requirements on banks'; and 
2. Placing the burden on banks' to assess their capital requirements, risk architecture and the 
controls necessary to satisfy them. 
The Individual Capital Adequacy Assessment Process ("ICAAP") is the component of Pillar 2 
assessment undertaken by firms. The ICAAP allows corporates the ability to assess the level of 
capital which adequately supports all current and forecast business risks. In undertaking an 
ICAAP, a firm can ensure that it has appropriate processes in place to ensure compliance with the 
Capital Requirements Directive. This requires banks' to develop and use appropriate risk 
management techniques and for regulators to engage actively in the review of those 
requirements, systems and controls: the Supervisory Review Evaluation Process ("SREP"). 
Supervisors, in most cases regulators, are required to evaluate how well banks' assess their 
capital needs in relation to their risks. Should the situation warrant any action supervisors have 
the ability to intervene. The objective here is to foster an active dialogue between banks' and 
their supervisors. This ensures that where shortfalls are identified, prompt and decisive action can 
be taken by either reducing risk or by restoring capital levels. Accordingly, supervisors may wish 
to adopt an approach to focus more intensely on banks' with higher risk profiles or less 
operational experience. 
A further aim of Pillar 2 is to enforce the notion that increasing capital levels should not be 
viewed as the sole solution for addressing banks' increasing risk profile, other alternatives 
available at the banks' disposal include; 
• Improving the capacity and efficiency of risk management: 
• Increasing the level of provisions and loan loss reserves: 
• The application of internal limits: and 
• Improving internal controls. 
With the Basel II Accord, specifically Pillar 2, the BCBS sought to cement the notion that capital 
cannot be regarded as a substitute for addressing inadequate risk management or control 
processes. 
Three main risk areas exist which are suited to treatment under Pillar 2: 
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1. Risks considered in Pillar 1, but not adequately captured by the process: This includes 
risks such as credit concentration risk; 
2. Factors which are completely overlooked in the Pillar 1 process: These factors include 
considerations like interest rate risk in the banking book, business and strategic risk; and 
3. Factors outside of the control of banks': these include such considerations as business 
cycles. 
Other important points of consideration include the assessment of banks" compliance in respect 
of the minimum standards, as well as the disclosure requirements of the IRB methods employed 
in Pillar 1. Bank supervisors are required to ensure that these requirements are met as qualifying 
criteria as well as on a continuing basis. 
2.5.2.1. Key principles of supervisory review 
As part of Basel II, the BeBS has identified four key principles of the supervisory review 
process. These principals complement the core Principles for effective banking supervision as 
well as the core principles methodology. In terms of these principals; 
1. Banks' require a process for assessing and maintaining overall capital adequacy in 
relation to their risk profile. 
2. Supervisory review and assessment of banks' internal capital adequacy and their 
respective compliance with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors have discretion to 
undertake supervisory action in the event the results of the supervisory assessment are not 
in line with minimum requirements. 
3. Supervisors require banks' to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios. As 
such supervisors have a discretionary power to mandate banks' to hold capital in excess 
of the minimum ratio. 
4. Supervisors have the ability to intervene early on, this prevents capital from falling below 
the minimum required levels. Furthermore this facilitates early and speedy remedial 
action in the event that capital is not maintained or restored. 
2.5.3. Pillar 3: Market discipline 
The objective of this pillar is to promote greater stability in the financial system. This pillar 
comprises a set of disclosure requirements which enables market participants to assess the 
capital adequacy of a bank. This disclosure encompasses information on the scope of 
application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment processes, etc. In addition to promoting 
greater market stability, this pillar also fosters good corporate governance. Market discipline 
contributes to a safer and sounder banking landscape, also complementing the minimum 
capital requirements, Pillar 1 and the supervisory review process, Pillar 2. 
Pillar 3 sets out the public disclosure requirements which banks' must make to provide greater 
insight into the adequacy of their capitalization. When marketplace participants have a 
sufficient understanding of a bank's activities and controls in place for the management of its 
exposures, they are better able to compare between banks' and as such reward those who 
manage risks prudently and penalize those who fare badly. 
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Basel II strongly recommended banks' to put in place a formal disclosure policy, approved by 
the board of directors, addressing the bank's approach to disclosures made, and the internal 
controls over the disclosure process. Banks' must also implement processes for assessing the 
appropriateness of their disclosures, including validation and frequency. 
It is important that the disclosure made by the bank include details relating to key banking 
risks, including but not limited to credit risk, market risk, interest rate risk and equity risk on 
the banking book and operational risk, as well as the techniques which banks' rely upon to 
identify, measure, monitor and control those risks as these are important considerations upon 
which market participants evaluate a bank. 
2.5.4. Drawbacks of Basel II 
As was the case with Basel I, Basel II was also the subject of heavy criticism. The subject of 
the most significant criticism related to the standardized approach, specifically the use of 
rating agencies in the determination of assets' risk. The reasoning behind this criticism 
contemplated the independence of agencies providing the rating. Ratings agencies may be 
considered biased, as opposes to being independent, given that they are remunerated by firms 
who are subject to the ratings. As such concerns stem from the reliability and objectivity of 
ratings provided. 
Illustrating the drawback of the credit rating agency method can be seen in the failure to 
consider, and protect against securitization trends which occurred before, and hastened the 
onset and impact of the global financial crisis. In terms of Basel II's standardized approach, all 
securitization assets held by banks' are assigned a risk weighting. However, the assets 
assigned risk weighting is subject to an assigned external credit rating. It can therefore be seen 
that credit rating agencies playa crucial role in the determination of capital levels to be held 
by banks' in relation to their securitization assets. 
As was the case with the subprime credit crisis, ratings agencies issued inaccurately high 
ratings to securitized products, the rational for these ratings being twofold. 
1. Rating agencies employed faulty rating methodologies in the assessment of securitization 
risks; and 
2. Rating agencies can be seen to have been conflicted, as they remunerated by parties 
subject to the ratings. Conflicts of interest arose, which impaired the ability of rating 
agencies to provide objective ratings on securitised assets. 
The highly rated securitized assets resulted in insufficient capital held against these assets. 
Insufficient capital levels left banks' relatively undercapitalized when compared to the risk 
inherent in these assets. When the assets underlying the securitized products defaulted, banks' 
were insufficiently capitalized to absorb these losses, this resulted in and hastened the impact 
of the global financial crisis. 
Another concern related to the standardized approach touches on the absence of a consistent 
ratings system. Basel II fails to specify the rating agencies banks' should rely on, this has 
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resulted in banks' employing various rating agencies. Each of these agencies employs their 
own proprietary rating methodologies, which has subsequently resulted in the inconsistent 
treatment of credit risk amongst banks'. 
Further critique of the standardized approach relates to the inadequate differentiation amongst 
unrated borrowers, the Standardized approach assigns unrated borrowers with a 100% risk 
rating. The standardized approach falls victim to the same criticisms leveled against Basel I, 
as it includes borrowers of varying risk profiles in the same risk bucket, ultimately 
incentivizing banks' to engage in regulatory arbitrage. 
Criticisms of the IRB approaches relate to the potential of assessing the real amount of risk in 
banks' assets. By employing asset specific inputs, the IRB approaches assign risk weightings 
unique to banks' assets. As a result, instead of the four risk buckets employed under Basel I, 
or the six risk buckets employed in the standardized approach, the IRB models are capable of 
producing an indefinite number of risk weightings from 0% on up. Instead of relying on 
overly broad risk insensitive buckets, the IRB approaches assign risk weightings that are 
unique to, and more reflective of banks' underlying assets. By allowing the banks' to conduct 
the risk assessment, the IRB approaches also give people familiar with the borrower the 
discretion to subjectively determine the risk associated with that borrower, this yields more 
accurate risk ratings. Therefore, in theory, Basel II's IRB approaches can be seen as a 
significant improvement over both the Basel I Accord, as well as Basel II's Standardized 
Approach which employs a bucket approach to risk weighting. 
Whilst the IRB approaches appear effective in theory, in practice these approaches are not 
without their faults. The internal production of risk assessments raises concerns about 
consistency, these come about because no two banks' would employ the same risk assessment 
methodology. If, for instance, two banks' assumed identical risk parameters but employed 
different risk models, the output from these IRB approaches would not yield consistent risk 
weightings for the same asset. As such regulators of banks' employing the IRB approaches 
assume a greater responsibility for ensuring that risk assessments are accurate. This is 
however problematic when considering the complexity of banks' internal methodologies. 
With these complexities in mind, regulators of IRB banks' may end up deferring to the banks' 
who devised these risk assessment methodologies. In this event, the IRB approaches would 
result in a situation where effectively, banks' would be regulating themselves. 
A further drawback of the IRB approach is its tendency for promoting pro cyclical bank 
behavior. Basel II's regulatory structure is the subject of criticism as it induces banks' to hold 
lower levels of capital during good economic cycles. This adversely impacts banks' when they 
are forced to take economically harmful actions, such as limiting new loans or undertaking 
deeply discounted equity offerings, during downswings as they seek to maintain adequate 
capital levels. During economic upswings, borrowers are better equipped to service their debt 
obligations. The IRB approaches used by banks', in most cases, reflect improving financial 
performances which results in lower credit risk estimates of banks' assets. These lower credit 
risk assessments result in banks" holding less capital. Conversely, during economic 
downturns, most recently the 2008-2009 global financial crises, when credit risk was at its 
greatest, the IRB approaches reflect these higher risk levels. The higher credit risk 
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assessments drive up banks' R W A, and thereby raises the amount of capital to be held by 
banks'. This increased capital requirement results in banks' lending less. This is termed a 
credit crunch, and exacerbates the severity of any ensuing economic crisis. Economic crises 
are prolonged when banks' lend less, as a result less money circulates in an economy, and this 
adversely impacts economic growth, and consequently delays any economic recovery. 
A credit crunch occurred during the most recent global financial crisis. Banks' held toxic 
assets, in the form of subprime loans, and had no option aside from reducing lending levels as 
a means of preventing the further erosion of their capital ratios. 
Basel II's shortcomings became particularly apparent to BeBS members countries prior to 
and during the onset of the global financial crisis. Whilst the crisis was ensuing, stakeholder 
engagements as to how to best improve the accord was already underway. Whilst the BeBS 
initially sought to structurally enhance the Accord, the severity of the crisis exacerbated the 
shortcomings thereof and hastened the urgency of which it was to be addressed. Following 
significant debate, November 2010 saw the BeBS release the most recent installment of the 
Basel Accords. This Accord was titled: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient 
banks' and Banking Systems. More commonly this has come to be known as Basel III. 
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3. Basel III: The Continuing Evolution of Bank Capital Regulation 
3.1. Introduction: 
In November 2010, member countries of the BCBS officially endorsed Basel III. Basel III 
reflects the lessons learned by the BCBS during the global financial crisis. This updated 
Accord seeks to apply these lessons to existing frameworks of banking regulation. In simple 
terms Basel III should not be viewed as a replacement for Basel II, instead the new Accord is 
slated as a supplement to its predecessors. Where Basel II sought to ensure that capital 
requirements were reflective of the risks underpinning banks' assets, Basel III aims to increase 
the quality and quantity of capital that banks' hold against these assets. 
In addition to supplementing the existing Basel Accords, the BCBS also undertook an 
extensive reassessment of its risk coverage assumptions and guidelines (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010). Seen as one of the most innovative components of the new, Basel III, 
Accord is the BCBS's creation of system wide macro prudential measures. Where Basel I and 
II's reforms were targeted at the individual bank level, Basel III introduces reforms at the 
macro prudential level. These reforms include the introduction of tools such as the 
countercyclical buffer as well as a universal leverage ratio. These tools aim to address 
systemic risk within the global financial system (Hannoun, 2010). 
3.2. Increasing the Quality and Quantity of Capital held against banks' assets 
During the design and consultation stages of the Basel III accord, the requirement the BCBS 
sought to ensure was the "need to strengthen the quality, consistency, and transparency of the 
regulatory capital base" (Bank for International Settlements, 2009). The reforms proposed 
within the accord aims to ensure that the capital bases of internationally active banks' are 
backed by high quality buffers which are able to absorb losses during periods of economic 
downturns. The new accord strengthened the definition of capital, focusing specifically on 
quality, transparency, and consistency. As discussed in chapter 2 of this research paper, Basel 
I set risk weighted capital requirement at 8.0%, with total capital divided equally amongst Tier 
1 and Tier 2 capital, to a great extent, this remained the status quo in Basel II. 
At face value, Basel III retains 8.0% total capital requirement, however the new accord 
prescribes at least 75% of banks' total capital be comprised of Tier 1 capital. This new 
requirement increases the proportion of Tier 1 capital from 2.0% of capital from the 4.0% 
level requirement under the Basel I and Basel II capital Accords. Consequently Tier 2 capital 
cannot comprise more than 2.0% (25%) of the 8.0% capital requirement. The new Basel III 
Accord further segments Tier 1 capital into two categories: 
1. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital; and 
2. Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
Based on the above segmentation of Tier 1 Capital, Basel III further requires that Common 
Equity Tier 1 must comprise at least 4.5% of banks' 8.0% capital ratio, furthermore Common 
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Tier 1 Equity must also comprise at least 75% of banks' Tier I Capital. Additional Tier 1 
capital makes up the remainder of Tier I capital, and can comprise up to a maximum of 25% 
of Tier I capital. Tier 2 Capital can comprise a maximum of 2.0% of banks' 8.0% capital 
ratio. The capital composition instituted by the Basel III Accord is best illustrated in the 
diagram below. 
Components of the banks' 8.0% capital ratio 
COIIIIIIOII Equity 
Tit'r I 
(4.5%) 
Tit'r t 75% 
Additional Ti('r I 
( 1.5";'.) 
Ti(>r 2 
(2.0';'.) 
3.2.1. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 
Common Equity Tier I Capital consists of common stock, common stock surpluses, and share 
premium and/or additional paid in capital. To qualify as Common Equity Tier I Capital, the 
BCBS requires that upon issuance instruments have the following characteristics: 
• Be the most subordinated claim in the event of a bank liquidation; 
• Feature a principal which is perpetual in nature; 
• Unable to be repurchased, redeemed, or cancelled; 
• Feature dividend terms that are at the discretion of the issuing entity; 
• Be recognizable as equity in respect of accounting standards; and 
• Issuance executed as part of an arm's length transaction with a third party. 
3.2.2. Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Additional Tier I Capital consists of paid in, and other forms of capital that fail to satisfy the 
standards of Tier I Common Equity Capital. Preferred stock can be considered an example of 
Additional Tier I Capital as these securities are structurally subordinated to depositors, creditors, 
and other subordinated bank debt. This form of capital also includes equity and subordinated debt 
instruments issued by banks' subsidiaries which are also held by third parties. Additional Tier I 
Capital also includes certain regulatory adjustments to capital. 
As is the case with instruments that qualify as Tier I Common Equity Capital, Additional Tier I 
Capital instruments may not be subject to credit sensitive features and must have been issued by 
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banks' to third party investors. Furthermore Additional Tier 1 Capital must also feature principals 
that are perpetual in nature, the terms of any dividend declarations must be at the discretion ofthe 
issuer, and where instruments are callable, strict rules must govern the nature of these 
instruments conversion. 
3.2.3. Tier 2 Capital 
Tier 2 Capital is responsible for providing loss absorption on a "gone-concern" basis; this is in 
contrast to Tier 1 Capital which is referred to as "going-concern" capital. In contrast between 
Tier 1 Capital provides banks' with an equity cushion, whilst Tier 2 Capital is responsible for 
absorbing losses in the event that banks' become insolvent. 
Whilst Tier 2 capital is primarily viewed as a loss absorber, this form of capital also serves to 
provide a cushion against losses. This form of capital is comprised of lower forms of equity and 
subordinated liabilities. Amongst its equity constituents is preferred stock with non-perpetual 
principals. Debt constituents include convertible debt as well as other subordinated debt. Tier 2 
Capital also consist of other equity instruments which fail to qualify as Tier 1 Capital. 
To be recognized as Tier 2 Capital, the BCBS's requires that at issuance: 
• The instrument must be subordinate to depositors and general creditors; 
• These instruments cannot be secured or guaranteed by the bank 
• Cannot possess credit sensitive dividend features. 
• Issuance must be executed as part of an arm's length transaction with a third party. 
• These instruments cannot feature terms which permit investors to accelerate payments in the 
event of an insolvency, liquidation, or bankruptcy. 
3.3. Establishing Additional Buffers 
In light of constrained capital, the BCBS has included within Basel III, new capital buffers that 
have the objective of defending against future losses. These buffers come on the back of the 
experiences garnered from the most recent global financial crises. Specifically, during the onset 
of the 2008/2009 global financial crisis, various banks' declared dividends and awarded staff 
bonuses (Carauna, 2010). This resulted in capital outflows, which subsequently eroded banks' 
reserves and reduced their ability to absorb losses. 
With the erosion of capital buffers in mind, the Basel III Accord includes both a Capital 
Conservation and a Countercyclical Buffer. Underpinning these buffers is the principal that 
banks' should build up capital during periods of economic growth. This capital can then be 
drawn upon during the periods of poor economic performance when unexpected losses are most 
likely to occur (Well ink, 2010). 
3.3.1. Capital Conservation Buffer 
The Capital Conservation Buffer requires banks' to hold an additional 2.5% of Total Capital in 
the form of Tier 1 Common Equity. This 2.5% is over and above the 4.5% minimum Tier 1 
Common Equity Capital banks' are required to hold in respect of the 8.0% capital ratio. In total, 
Basel III increases the Tier 1 Common Equity requirement to 7.0% (4.5% + 2.5%) ofRW A. 
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Whilst banks' are allowed to dip below the 7.0% ratio during periods of financial or economic 
stress, banks' must rebuild this buffer through reductions in discretionary distributions8. In the 
event that banks' fail to voluntarily reduce these distributions, whilst these banks' are below the 
2.5% Capital Conservation Buffer, the Accord encourages regulators to implement cutbacks in 
banks' discretionary distributions until the buffer is re-established (Hannoun, 2010). 
The extent to which regulators can cutback discretionary distributions is dependent on how much 
banks' have eroded their Capital Conservation Buffer. Banks' who possesses capital levels close 
to the 2.5% buffer face less stringent constrains than banks' that fall significantly shy of the 2.5% 
buffer. This is illustrated in the following table. 
Total Common Equity Tier 1 
Ratio (%) 
4.5 - 5.125 
> 5.125 - 5.75 
> 5.75 - 6.375 
> 6.375 - 7.0 
> 7.0 
Capital Conservation Buffer 
(%) 
0-0.625 
0.625 - 1.25 
1.25 - 1.875 
1.875 - 2.5 
2.5 
Note' «%) of earnings banks' are required to hold to rebuild buffer) 
Minimum Capital 
Conservation Ratio' 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
0% 
(%) of earnings available for 
discretionary distributions 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
100% 
The above table illustrates the sliding scale envisioned by the BCBS. As an example, a bank with 
a Common Equity Tier I ratio of 5.5% and a capital conservation buffer of only I % would have 
to conserve 80% of its earnings in the subsequent year to rebuild the buffer, limiting 
discretionary distributions to only 20% of earnings. 
Banks' can avoid these restrictions by recapitalizing the buffer through capital raisings (such as 
rights issues). Given economic and financial circumstances Banks' may from time to time dip 
into the capital conservation buffer to absorb losses. However it is important to note that banks' 
may not flexibly operate within the buffer range to enhance their competitive posture relative to 
other banks'. With this in mind, Basel III instructs regulators to employ their discretion to impose 
time limits on banks' operating within the buffer. 
3.3.2. The Countercyclical Buffer 
Evidenced by the financial crisis, losses incurred in the banking sector can be extremely large. 
This is especially true when an economic downturn is preceded by a period of excess credit 
growth. Easy access to credit results in the accumulation of loans, these results in price and yield 
increases, ultimately this often results in the creation of asset bubbles (Hannoun, 20 I 0). 
Eventually when asset bubbles, prices plummet, loans get defaulted on, and the extension of new 
credit becomes constrained. The reduced availability of credit compounds the erosion of asset 
prices resulting in an in the amount of defaults. 
As a means of mitigating against this cycle, Basel III employs a Countercyclical Buffer. As is the 
case with the Capital Conservation Buffer, this buffer is also comprised of Common Equity Tier 
8 Basel III considered the following items to be distributions: dividends, share buy-backs, discretionary payments on other Tier 1 instruments, and discretionary bonus 
payments to staff. Payments that do not result in depleting Common Equity Tier 1 below the 7% minimum, such as scrip dividends, are not considered distributions 
under Basellll. 
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1 Capital which serves as a second pool of capital, and is accumulated during periods of high 
credit growth. Theoretically, the objective of this buffer is to reduce the availability of credit 
during high growth periods, and simultaneously reduce the pressure of restricting credit growth 
during economic downturns. 
This buffer places reliance on national regulators to monitor credit growth relative to indicators 
like GOP. When regulators determine that credit growth has been excessive, regulators can 
impose the Countercyclical Buffer on banks' in their jurisdictions9. 
The size of the Countercyclical Buffer can range from 0.0% to 2.5% and is dependent on 
financial stability factors experienced in each jurisdiction. When a Countercyclical Buffer is 
implemented, banks' must comply within a 12 month period, or as is the case with the Capital 
Conservation Buffer, face restrictions on discretionary distributions (Caruana, 2010). 
3.3.3. Potential 13% Capital Ratio (with Buffers) 
With Basel Ill's introduction of the Capital Conservation and Countercyclical Buffers, the 8.0% 
capital ratio which underpinned the Basel I and II accords increases to 13% under Basel III. As 
can be seen from the illustration below, 85% of banks' capital ratio must be comprised of high 
quality Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, whilst only 15% comprises Tier 2 capital. 
Based on Basel Ill's stated objective of increasing the quality and quantity of capital held against 
banks' assets, we can observe that under the new accord, 85% of banks' capital comprises high 
quality Tier 1 Capital this illustrates an increase in the quality of capital in contrast to the earlier 
accords. Furthermore the new Accord also results in an increase in the capital ratio from 8.0% to 
13%. 
3.4. Introducing a Leverage Ratio 
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During the development and commentary phases of the Basel III Accord, the BCBS remained 
mindful of the fact that many banks' had built up excessive leverage, yet these banks' were able 
9 Internationally active banks will be subject to a weighted average of the buffers applied in each of the jurisdictions in which the bank had credit exposures, 
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to show strong capital ratios. With this in mind, the BCBS rejected the notion that capital 
requirements be measured and maintained solely on R W A. 
To remedy such occurrences the BCBS has adopted a further measure for reinforcing the current 
risk based capital requirements. Basel III introduces a Leverage Ratio which compares Tier 1 
Capital against banks' to total exposure, without taking into account RWA. A leverage ratio of at 
least 3.0% (i.e. Tier 1 capital should be at least 3% of total exposure) is the suggested target for 
Banks'. 
Basel III's Leverage Ratio remains a work in progress, key for consideration is the calculation of 
the total exposure to be used in the Leverage Ratio's denominator. To date, the BCBS has agreed 
the following important principles: 
• Assets of subsidiaries, which are consolidated from an accounting perspective, need not be 
included in the measure of total exposure. This is the true in the instance that investments in 
these entities are deducted from Tier 1 Capital for regulatory purposes; 
• In the calculation of total exposure, loans cannot be netted off against deposits. Furthermore 
collateral and other credit risk mitigating instruments must be disregarded; 
• Derivatives are be included in the calculation of total exposures by employing a Loan 
Equivalent methodology as is prescribed in the Basel II Accord; and 
• Both on and off balance sheet assets are included in the calculation of total exposure. Off 
balance sheet assets employ a credit conversion factor of 100%. 
Though the broader market participants may find this additional measure beneficial to bank 
market regulation, it remains too early to say whether this additional measurement will have a 
positive effect on banks' lending behavior. Should the Leverage Ratios be incorrectly calculated, 
there exists a danger of unintended consequences, for this reason the BCBS has instituted a 
lengthy implementation period. The Leverage Ratio came into effect on January 15t 2013, 
however the BCBS continues to collect data during the Leverage Ratio's current observation 
period which ends on January 15t 2017. 
3.5. Managing Counterparty Risks 
In assessing the risks arising from on-and off-balance sheet transactions, as well as derivative 
related exposures, the shortcomings of earlier Accords become increasingly apparent. The Basel 
II Accord allowed banks' to calculate the risks of their trading book assets with the VAR model. 
In general, VAR models output smaller capital charges than the charges that would be seen if the 
same asset were to be held on the banking book. V AR models employed by banks' assume a 
degree of liquidity in trading book assets, however leading up to the financial crisis banks' built 
up positions in both derivatives and securitization products. These securitization assets proved to 
be less liquid and significantly more risky during times of market stress. This ultimately resulted 
in large losses as a consequence. 
In attempting to rectify this potential arbitrage opportunity, the V AR model was subsequently 
amended and reintroduced by the BCBS during 2009. This capital measure was further 
supplemented, with the inclusion of a charge accounting for turbulent market conditions. 
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The calculation of the stressed and consequently higher V AR capital charge takes into account a 
stress calibrated VAR model which assumes a 12 month period of stressed financial conditions. 
The rules governing Basel Ill's capital charges in regards to securitizations have also been 
standardized across both the banking and trading books, thereby eliminating any further arbitrage 
opportunities. 
The treatment of the trading book and the securitization market's exposure remains a key area of 
consideration for the BCBS. Nevertheless, the BCBS has also proposed various alternatives with 
the objective of mitigating counterparty credit risk in both the derivatives and structured 
financing markets. These proposed alternatives aim at removing anomalies in Basel Ill's 
treatment of securitization assets. Counterparty credit risk and external ratings, particularly in the 
context of Cliff Effects IO remains two areas which require considerable focus from the BCBS. 
3.5.1. Counterparty Credit Risk 
The Basel III Accord emphasizes that banks' calculate their capital requirements under a worst 
case scenario ll . In doing so, the BCBS focuses on the following key topics: 
3.5.1.1. Stress testing of default risk: 
Basel III requires that banks' calculate their default risk capital charge by taking into account a 
stress calibration as part of the exposure calculation. The stress calibration must take into account 
at least three years of historical data, which should also include a period of increased credit 
spreads allowing for a cross section of banks' counterparties. 
The data underpinning the stress calibration must be updated on at least a quarterly basis, or 
possible more frequently if conditions warrant it. To assess the adequacy ofthese stress models, a 
bank must measure its calculations against a benchmark portfolio that is subject to the same 
market susceptibilities as the bank and that is calculated using similar stress calibrated data. 
3.5.1.2. Credit Valuation Adjustments: 
Basel III also requires banks' to hold capital against marked to market losses stemming from a 
decline in the creditworthiness of its counterparties 12. Secured financing transactions are not 
covered unless potential losses are deemed material by the banks' regulator. The calculation is 
made on the basis of a bond equivalent valuation, though the exact calculation methodology is 
subject to the banks' approved model. 
3.5.1.3. Wrong Way Risk: 
The identification and mitigation of wrong way risk is viewed as another means of improving the 
evaluation of Counterparty Credit Risk. Wrong Way Risk arises when a bank's exposure to a 
counterparty increases whilst the credit worthiness of the counterparty declines. 
10 Cliff effects describes a one or two notch rating change which leads to a step change in investment portfolios and therefore an outsized impact on market prices. 
11 The new measures also identify specific areas of credit risk which encourages their assessment and mitigation. 
12 This requirement is known as the credit valuation adjustment. This adjustment applies to all GTe derivatives cQunterparties that are not central clearing 
cQunterparties. 
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An illustrative example is the case in which a bank holds put options written by a corporate on its 
own shares. Basel III requires banks' to monitor wrong way risk through the analysis of defined 
sectors including industry and product, as well as in reference to specific transactions. 
3.5.1.4. Asset value correlation for large institutions: 
To account for the systemic risk that could arise from the failure or default of a large 
counterparty, a multiplier of 1.25x is applied to the asset value correlation for exposures to: 
1. Regulated financial institutions with assets in excess of $1 00 billion; and 
2. All unregulated financial companies, this is irrespective of size. 
3.5.1.5. Collateralized Counterparties: 
Basel III proposes a variety of measures for improving the management and calculation of 
collateral. The BCBS established a minimum period at risk of five business days for margin 
calculations on netting sets of transactions, such as repo transactions, while all other such 
transactions entail ten business days. 
In the case of sets exceeding 5,000 transactions or for sets involving derivatives considered hard 
to replace or illiquid collateral this minimum period at risk increases to twenty business days. 
When assessing the appropriate period at risk, banks' that are subject to Basel III must consider 
whether they are able to replace trades, when these trades are concentrated to a particular 
counterparty. 
3.5.1.6. Central Counterparties: 
More transactions and trades being facilitated through Central Counterparty ("CCP") clearing in 
the Over the Counter ("OTC") derivatives markets and is seen as a key factor in the reduction of 
risk. This is evidenced in initiatives by both the U.S. and E.U. legislatures13 . 
The BCBS encourages the movement to CCP's and has introduced a low capital charge, 2.0%, on 
exposures to CCp'SI4 that satisfy the criteria specified by the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"). These criteria include measures pertaining to capital, 
collateral maintenance, and governance. 
Exposures to CCP's that do not meet the IOSCO's criteria are treated as any other bilateral 
exposure, and must meet the 8.0% capital requirement. 
3.5.1.7. Enhanced Counterparty Credit Risk Management: 
In addition to the above listed counterparty considerations, the BCBS has introduced further 
measures for improving the quality of the risk assessments, practices, and procedures. 
I' Proposals on the establishment and operation ofCCPs, and a compulsOIY clearing obligation for certain OTC derivatives have been published in both the U.S. (part 
of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the E.U. draft regulation published Sept. 15, 2010). 
I' Under Basel 11, 0% risk weight applied, and many anticipated that this standard would continue to apply. The BCBS determined, however, that imposing a small 
charge would encourage prudent risk monitoring practices and would also clarify that "even trade exposures to compliant CCPs are not risk free. 
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Particular emphasis is placed on how these operations function during periods of market 
turbulence. Counterparty credit exposure and product risks must be captured in a timely manner 
and subjected to regular and extensive stress testing. The integrity of forecasting and estimation 
models must be continually ensured. These models must also be subjected to regular validation 
and testing, which includes back testing. Furthermore, both banks' and their supervisors must be 
alert to the consistency in the use of these models. 
• The BCBS emphasise the importance of banks" risk management functions and recommends 
that these operations be supported by: 
- Senior management that is actively involved on a continuing basis; 
- Recognition of the risk management exposure; 
- Models of day-to-day business operations; and 
- Policies and procedures that is well understood and documented. 
Furthermore the BCBS requires that the systems responsible for monitoring banks' risk 
management systems and procedures be reviewed at least annually. Banks' must also have an 
independent and distinct risk control unit that asses risk measurement, credit exposure and 
trading limits on a daily basis. 
3.6. External Ratings and Cliff Effects 
3.6.1. External Ratings: 
The Basel II Accord permitted banks' to use credit ratings issued by External Credit Assessment 
Institutions ("ECAI") for assessing their risk weightings. An unintended consequence of using 
ECAI's has resulted in many banks' being unable to make their own assessments of risk. To 
address this unintended consequence, Basel III employs a policy wherein banks' make their own 
independent credit risk assessments of rated instruments. 
In addition, for rating agencies to qualify as ECAI's, agencies must comply with IOSCO's "Code 
of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies". This is particularly important from the 
perspective of the ratings transparency process. It is expected that the BCBS will in the future 
issue additional proposals, this is likely follow its review of the securitization framework and the 
use of external ratings. 
3.6.2. Credit protection: 
Basel III recognizes credit risk protection providers under the Accords credit risk mitigation 
provisions. To qualify under these provisions, providers must be externally rated, and be rated no 
worse than A- or the equivalent. In the event that a ratings downgrade was to occur, these 
provisions may result in cliff effects. Cliff effects described a scenario where a one or two notch 
rating change results in a step change in investment portfolios. The changes in investment 
portfolios have an outsized impact on market prices. The aftermath of the ratings downgrade 
leads banks' to hold more capital against these rated assets. Where cliff effects occur and banks' 
are unable to increase its capital, insufficient capital levels may result in further downgrades, 
with the cycle thereby repeating itself. 
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To counteract the risk of cliff effects, the BCBS has proposed that the requirement, for credit risk 
providers to be rated A- or better, be eliminated for non-securitization exposures. Where 
securitization exposures are concerned, credit protection will only be recognized if the provider 
of the protection is rated BBB as a minimum, and a minimum rating of A- when the protection 
was initialized. 
3.7. Improving Liquidity 
Considering the drivers of the global financial crisis, it is evident that the crisis was driven by 
poor liquidity. Banks' ability to raise short-term funds was severely constrained, and converting 
bank assets into cash became increasingly difficult, where it did take place, these sales were done 
at substantial haircuts. Consequently, banks' were forced to draw down on Central Bank lending 
facilities. 
As collateral, eligible to Central Banks, dwindled, combined with the impact of severe erosions 
in value of banks' less liquid assets, the constrained liquidity experienced during the crisis lead to 
erosion in banks' capital levels. 
With the acknowledgment that liquidity is an important contributor to the stability of the banking 
sector, in 2008 the BCBS published the Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and 
Supervision. More recently, the BCBS also published the first harmonized Liquidity Standards, a 
key component of Basel III. 
Key to these standards, the BCBS introduced two minimum liquidity standards: 
1. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio ("LCR"); and 
2. The Net Stable Funding Ratio ("NSFR"). 
3.7.1. Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The LCR was designed to ensure that multinational banks' hold sufficient, unencumbered, high-
quality liquid assets that can be used to offset any net cash outflows banks' may be susceptible 
to. This ratio takes into consideration a month long acute stress scenario, which is comprised of 
both systemic and bank specific shocks. 
These stress scenario's contemplate downgrades in banks' credit ratings, partial losses in 
deposits, an inability to procure unsecured wholesale funding, increases in secured funding 
haircuts, increases in derivative collateral calls, and calls on off-balance sheet exposures. 
LCR Formula 
Stock of high quality liquid assets :2: 100% 
Total net cash outflow over the next 30 days 
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The equations' numerator represents banks' "stock of high quality liquid assets". These high 
quality assets must be unencumbered and are characterized with low credit and market risk 
susceptibility, ease and certainty of valuation, and low correlation with risky assets l5 . 
Operationally these assets must be used as a source of contingent funds, and available for banks' 
to convert at any time, so it can be used to fill funding gaps. These high quality liquid assets are 
divided into Level I and Level 2 Assets. 
• Level 1 Assets: These are not subject to haircuts under any stress scenarios, and are comprised 
of cash and Central Bank reserves which can be drawn upon. 
- Level 1 Assets also include marketable securities, issued or guaranteed by governments, 
Central Banks, multilateral development banks', and other public sector entities. 
• Level 2 Assets, are those assets which are subject to haircuts of at least 15%. After accounting 
for haircuts, Level 2 Assets can comprise a maximum of 40% of the LCR's numerator. 
- Marketable securities, such as corporate and covered bonds, issued by non-financial 
institutions comprise Level 2 Assets. 
Total net cash outflow is defined as banks' total expected cash outflows less the total expected 
cash inflows during a stressed scenario. Cash inflows are capped at 75% of expected outflows, 
thus implying that net cash outflows and the corresponding minimum for high quality liquid 
assets, may not fall below 25% of expected cash outflows in the 30 day stress scenario. 
When calculating banks' expected cash inflows, banks' must include inflows from outstanding 
exposures, currently performing, and which banks' has no expectations of default within the 30 
day horizon. Once expected cash inflows for the 30 day stress scenario are determined, this 
amount is deducted from the expected cash outflows, up to a total of 75% of the outflows. The 
resulting net cash outflow corresponds to the minimum stock of high quality liquid assets that 
Basel Ill's LCR requires banks' to maintain. 
As the equation suggests, the LCR requires that banks' hold, at minimum, an equal amount of 
high quality liquid assets against its net cash outflows for the next 30 days. 
3.7.2. Net Stable Funding Ratio 
In contrast to the LCR, aimed at ensuring short term liquidity during periods of stress, the NSFR 
promotes medium and long term funding with the establishment of minimum liquidity levels. 
These liquidity levels are premised on banks' assets and their activities which include assets 
related to off-balance sheet commitments, over a 1 year period of extended stress. 
The NSFR requires that Available Stable Funding ("ASF") exceed Required Stable Funding 
("RSF") for assets and off balance sheet commitment exposures. 
NSFR Formula 
Available amount of stable funding :2: 100% 
Required amount of stable funding 
15 Ideally, these should also be Central Bank eligible .. 
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ASF is defined banks' total regulatory capital, this includes: 
• Preferred stock with maturities in excess of one year; 
• Liabilities with maturities in excess one year; and 
• Non maturity and term deposits, as well as wholesale funding with maturities of less than one 
year, that are expected to remain with banks' for an extended period in the instance of an 
idiosyncratic stress event. 
Funding sources are weighted differently and are subject to whether they are considered "stable" 
or "less stable". Furthermore they depend on the nature of the entity providing the funding. 
The Required Stable Funding is based on the liquidity profiles of banks' assets and their off 
balance sheet exposure. The RSF is calculated by multiplying an RSF factor, which is assigned to 
each type of asset, by the value held in each asset class. Thereafter banks' must add the amount 
of off balance sheet activity, also, multiplied by its corresponding RSF factor. 
These RSF factors approximate the proportions of asset classes that will not be monetized either 
through sale, or which can be used as collateral in secured borrowing during a yearlong liquidity 
event. 
3.8. Dealing with Systemically important financial institution's ("SIFI") 
Basel III advocates increasing capital and liquidity requirements, these increased requirements 
are expected to result in a strengthening of banks'. However whilst these efforts will strengthen 
individual banks', they do not address the systemic risk which arise from the interconnectedness 
of banks', specifically those banks' who are perceived to be "too big to fail". 
Consequently the BCBS working with the United Kingdom's Financial Services Board ("FSB") 
are developing a series of proposals to address SIFI's. These proposals include considerations 
which include capital and liquidity surcharges, tighter restrictions on large exposures, mandatory 
recovery and resolution plans, and contingent capital and bail in debt requirements. 
Of the proposals contemplated, seen as the most critical is the potential requirement that all non-
common Tier 1 and Tier 2 Capital instruments, such as common equity, preferred equity and 
subordinated debt, that are issued by SIFI's be inclusive of terms that ensures these instruments 
be written off prior to any public sector capital infusion (Bank for International Settlements, 
2010). 
These proposals are complementary to other broader macro reforms, all of which aim to reduce 
the pooling of risk and addressing problems which would arise in the event of a SIFI's failure. 
Currently, all of these SIFI related proposals remain in their infancy. 
BCBS aimed to release a provisional methodology for assessing systemic importance by 2011 
(Financial Stability Board, 2010), however this methodology remains a work-in-progress. The 
BIS recently suggested that while indicators, such as bank size, can be considered reliable 
proxies for systemic importance, to date no consensus has been reached in so far as defining the 
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class of SIFls to be subjected to capital surcharges or other additional requirements. Neither as a 
consensus been reached as to what those additional requirements may be. 
3.9. Implementing Basel III 
Basel III was introduced with the objective of improving the safety and soundness of banks', and 
the broader banking sector. With this objective in mind the Accord sought to increase the quality 
and quantity of capital to be held by banks'. Whilst the broader objectives of the Accord are well 
understood, many bankers and regulators alike have cautioned against the rapid implementation 
of these reforms, with many cautioning against unintended consequences. 
With much of the global banking sector only starting to emerge from years of recovery, the 
BCBS has established a phased implementation timetable for the roll out of Basel III. This 
timetable weighs up the desire for increased capital and liquidity requirements against the need to 
facilitate economic recovery. 
Basel Ill's phased implementation approach commenced in January 2013, however the full 
Accord is only expected to be implemented by January 2019. Per its objective of increasing the 
quality and quantity of capital, achieving a Common Equity Tier 1 Capital ratio of 4.5% and an 
overall Tier 1 Capital ratio of 6.0% is seen as the BCBS's highest priority. Consequently, the 
implementation of these requirements must take place by January 2015, this being at least four 
years earlier than some of the Accords other features. 
Once Basel Ill's core capital ratios have been implemented, the Capital Conservation Buffer will 
start to be phased in from January 2016. The implementation of this ratio will commence with an 
initial buffer of 0.625%, with a further 0.625% being added to the buffer each year up until the 
buffer reaches 2.5%. The implementation of the Countercyclical Buffer runs in parallel to the 
Capital Conservation Buffer, however national regulators may choose to accelerate the 
implementation and size of the Countercyclical Buffer dependent subject to jurisdiction specific 
circumstances. 
The leverage ratio was phased in from January 1, 2013 with final implementation scheduled for 
December 31, 2016. During this period, banks' must calculate their leverage ratios and starting 
January 1, 2015, must also publicly disclose these ratios. Subsequently the 3.0% Leverage Ratio 
comes fully into force on January 1, 2017. 
The BCBS's implementation of the Basel II's new Liquidity Ratios follows a more staggered 
approach: 
• The LCR is expected to be officially introduced, as a minimum standard, by January 1,2015; 
and 
• The NSFR is only expected to be introduced by January 1,2018. 
To date, no time frame for the implementation of any of the additional capital charges, 
envisioned for SIFI's is envisioned. However the BCBC is in the process of coordinating its work 
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on this topic with the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") and the European 
Systemic Risk Board ("ESRB") as these bodies address SIFls in their respective jurisdictions. 
3.10. Conclusion 
The Basel III Accord represents sizeable milestone in the development of uniform, and internally 
reaching capital requirements. The Accord emphasizes the quality and quantity of core capital, 
with the overriding objective of fortifying banks' capital cushions as the framework's 
cornerstone. 
Through the correction of the identified shortfalls of Basel I and II, the BCBS has designed a 
regime that incorporates liquidity requirements as well as numerous macro prudential tools to 
reduce systemic risk. It is however worth mentioning that none of these reforms are expected to 
be implemented cheaply. Bank capital and its ability to absorb losses without impacting the 
global economy are critical, but expensive. In the future, regulators will be required to contrast 
Basel Ill's benefits against the costs of its implementation. 
This becomes apparent when we take into consideration the considerations voiced by detractors 
of the Accord who believe aspects of the reforms outlined and discussed throughout this chapter 
will hamper economic recovery, and may impede economic growth. The BCBS itself has 
admitted that Basel III will have an impact, modest, on growth in the short term (Bank for 
International Settlements, 2011). However, with this in mind they designed the phased 
implementation calendar with the objective of minimizing any deleterious effects on economic 
growth. 
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4. How does reforming financial regulation affect the emerging market? 
4.1. Preamble: 
As discussed through the breath of this research paper the impact of the most recent financial 
meltdown has resulted in the episode commonly termed the "Great Recession", a lesson which 
has warranted the distinction of being contrasted against the great depression of 1929. With 
the most recent iteration of the Basel accord designed primarily to ensure that the banking 
industry avoids the behaviour and practices which resulted in the global crash. 
As a result of the increased capital adequacy, bolstered supervisory review, and sterner market 
discipline regulation brought on by Basel III one of the concerns of emerging markets is that 
the accord will succeed in its objective, but in doing so stunt the growth of the emerging 
markets, specifically Africa and other frontier markets16. 
This chapter leverages on research prepared by the G20 where it commissioned the FSB, 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") to analyse the effects of regulatory 
reforms on emerging markets. This paper also discusses the findings of research carried out by 
the private sector. 
4.2. Introduction: 
With the objective of reinforcing the stability of banks' and the banking sector in mind, 
following the effects of the global financial crisis, the G20 agreed numerous reforms, the 
impact of which was also globally felt. Although the implementation of Basel III has been 
applauded by developed economies, these developed economies are also implementing their 
own reforms to supplement the core international standards set by the FSB and BCBS. 
From a financial development perspective, the goals and objectives of Emerging markets are 
completely different to those being sought by developed economies (Dorrucci, Meyer-Cirkel, 
and Santabarbara, 2009). This can be seen at the sovereign level, but also the ways in which 
these countries fund themselves. The banking sectors in most of these countries are in most 
cases fundamentally less sophisticated and more often than not their financial markets are far 
less developed. In developed economies the current mandate is to manage banks' classified as 
SIFI's and ensure the deleveraging process is carried out. This is in order to meet regulatory 
priorities. 
In emerging markets, banks' have a greater responsibility to support economic growth, job 
creation, and financial inclusion. As mentioned above these emerging markets have less 
developed capital markets', furthermore these banks' are also subjected to increasing 
competition with banks' from developed economies on the international stage. With this in 
mind ensuring that banks' are healthy and have the ability to deliver credit for investment in 
emerging markets are of critical importance. As such, any proposed regulation, or externalities 
16 Less advanced capital markets from the developing world. Frontier markets are countries with investable stock markets that are less established than those in the 
emerging markets. Available at http://www.investopedia.com/tennslf/frontier-market.asp 
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which are expected to impact the competitiveness, ability of emerging market banks to 
achieve the above mentioned economic growth objectives must be carefully considered. 
Whilst the term "emerging markets" is used widely throughout this research paper, the traits 
common to all of these markets are; imperatives towards economic growth, comparatively less 
developed, and thinner capital markets. 
This chapter seeks to discuss and addresses: 
l. The impact of banking regulation, such as the Basel Accords, on banks' operating in 
emerging markets; 
2. The impact these reforms may have on the drivers of economic growth in these emerging 
markets; and 
3. Potential measures of addressing the issues highlighted above. 
4.3. The impact of Banking Regulation on Banks Operating in Emerging Markets 
Quantifying the impact of the most recent series of reforms remains unclear. To date these 
have only been partly implemented whilst some remain a work-in-progress. While only BCBS 
member countries have to implement Basel III, some emerging markets may have choose to 
either implement Basel III or develop regulatory regimes that draw on the principals of Basel 
III. What is evident is that banks' from developed economies will need to change their 
operating to meet the new regulatory regime, in some cases this may entail withdrawing from 
operations considered noncore. Whilst the latest iteration of the Basel Accords, Basel III, is 
slated to yield substantial benefits, concerns have been raised that implementing these 
reforms, at least in the short run, may hamper economic growth, and result in unintended 
consequences. To this extent the BCBS has admitted that Basel III will have an impact on 
growth in the short term. Other unintended consequences include: 
1. Increasing cost of finance: In the short run, the cost of increasing capital ratios may result 
in banks' reducing lending and increase cost of finance; 
2. Deleveraging of banks' balance sheets: Increasing the proportion of capital in relation to 
total assets means that banks' would reduce their liabilities; and 
3. Structural changes to the multinational banking model: The entry of foreign banks' into 
emerging markets has been shown to improve the functioning of host country's bank 
market, this comes about through increased efficiency and market competition. 
4.3.1. The impact of liquidity: 
Inadequate capitalisation underpinned by inadequate liquidity regulation in the developed 
world without doubt contributed to the financial crisis. As a means of addressing these 
shortfalls, the Basel III accords liquidity regime introduced two requirements; 
1. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio; and 
2. The Net Stable Funding Ratio. 
4.3.1.1. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio: 
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This ratio was introduced to prevent a reoccurrence of failures experienced during the global 
economic crisis. Changes to regulation that governs liquidity are expected to have a profound 
impact on both developed and emerging economies. It should however be noted that these 
economies may not be impacted in the same way. 
With the wounds of previous financial crises still in memory, many emerging markets have 
established robust liquidity regimes. How Basel III will work in these markets is yet to be 
clarified, this is only compounded by disparities in the banking models in operation. If we 
were to overlook the differences between individual countries within the emerging economies 
group, the new regulation gives rise to issues common to most of them. 
The LCR requirement of holding high quality liquid assets within buffers, poses problems for 
emerging markets. Emerging markets issue sovereign debt less frequently than developed 
market. Many of the most underdeveloped of the emerging markets have insufficient levels of 
sovereign debt in issue, thus impeding their banks' to meet buffer requirements. The 
alternative of placing funds with Central Banks, yields increased liquidity costs and 
subsequently results in an increase in the overall cost finance. 
Should these emerging markets issue more sovereign debt, which will enable their banks' to 
meet the liquidity buffer requirements, these countries face the risk of defaulting on their debt 
servicing obligations. This trend has already been seen in some of developed economies, 
specifically southern Europe. Employing such an alternative would be counterintuitive to 
meeting the new regulatory policy, which has the stated objective of strengthening the 
financial market. 
Another alternative available to banks' from emerging markets is to increase their holdings of 
highly rated liquid assets from developed economies countries. However, as governments of 
developed economies continue to face ratings downgrades, banks' are being to look elsewhere 
and are targeting alternative high grade issuers. This has resulted in increased demand for 
securities from stronger emerging market sovereigns such as the United Arab Emirates, China 
and Qatar. As demand for this paper increases, its availability will become limited, banks' will 
subsequently be forced to look at sovereign backed entities originating from these countries. 
That being said, taking into account foreign exchange and country specific risks, holding 
liquidity buffers comprised of foreign securities, irrespective of their rating, is far from 
perfect. 
Further ways through which emerging markets can meet the LCR buffer requirement is by 
holding Level 2 Assets, defined as high quality non-sovereign instruments such as covered 
and corporate bonds. These instruments can comprise up to 40% of the buffer and are subject 
to valuation haircuts. In most emerging markets however the availability of such instruments 
is also limited. The covered bond market is insufficiently developed as an asset class and high 
quality corporate paper is only available in limited quantities. This is as a result of the 
underdeveloped capital markets and ratings constraints. To qualify for the LCR liquid asset 
buffer, corporate bonds are subject to credit rating requirements. Corporate ratings are capped 
at the rating of its country. Given their existing levels of development, many of the emerging 
markets are rated lower than the minimum standards required by the LCR. 
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Such issues concerning the appropriateness of the LCR for emerging markets are not limited 
to the asset buffer, but also impact the treatment of banks' liabilities. A case in point, not all 
countries operate deposit insurance schemes, however, in terms of Basel III liquidity, the 
regime identifies deposit insurance as a criteria for classifying deposits as stable. In such a 
case the depth of relationship between banks', their clients and the channel by which deposit 
are garnered could be a better indicator of deposit stability under stressed conditions. 
The BCBS's current review of the LCR, covering both the definition of assets eligible for the 
liquidity buffer, and the treatment liability classes, needs to take full account of emerging 
market considerations prior to its introduction in January 2015. 
4.3.1.2. The Net stable funding ratio: 
In the context of emerging markets, the NSFR appears even more challenging than the LCR. 
The European Banking Authority ("EBA") estimates that European banks' alone will face a 
shortfall against the NSFR of around € 1. 9trn, estimated at 75% of the European senior debt 
market. This is a significant hurdle for European banks' as they are also faced with distressed 
economic outlook. From the perspective of emerging markets banks', the NSFR, will be very 
demanding as a result of limited depth in local funding markets, and the resultant stresses on 
the global funding markets. 
Aside from the direct impact of implementing Basel Ill's liquidity regime on emerging market 
banks', there is also a likely indirect consequence to arise as banks' in developed economies, 
particularly Europe, refocus their coverage models. These indirect consequences are 
highlighted when taking into consideration the recent EBA stress tests. These tests required 
various European banks' to meet a 9.0% Core Tier 1 Capital ratio without reducing credit 
exposure in the European Union. For European banks' to complying with these requirements 
many would likely have to withdraw from their operations in emerging markets. As will be 
discussed later in this paper, this will result in a negative consequence for the banking sectors 
in these foreign economies. 
Additionally areas like project and infrastructure finance that are characteristic of long tenors, 
with exposures in many emerging markets, and subject to large international bank 
involvement in raising finance, are also very likely to be affected. From the perspective of 
emerging markets, this will have a detrimental impact on infrastructure development over the 
foreseeable future, or at least until other viable alternatives are developed. Nomura concludes 
that the Basel III liquidity regime" ... has the potential to markedly alter global asset allocation 
decisions, the conduct of Central Bank monetary policy and the shape of global yield curves" 
(Nomura, 2012). 
4.3.2. Rising Cost of Finance - Capital 
Historically many emerging market banks' were better capitalised than there developed 
market peers. As a means of increasing their capital rations, internationally active banks' with 
operations in emerging markets may have to change their strategies and business models. 
40 
Various emerging markets operate effective, interventionist macro-prudential regimes. 
However none of the Basel Accord has given consideration to the effects and benefits that 
such regimes add to financial stability. Effective macro prudential regulation embeds a degree 
of safety in the overall regulatory regime, implying that further capital requirements may offer 
less incremental benefit. 
Numerous private sector assessments have analysed the incremental costs of implementing 
Basel III and its impact on economic growth and bank credit supply (Ghosh, Sugawara and 
Zalduendo 2011). Whilst less emphasis has been placed on the Accords impact on emerging 
markets, the World Bank estimates that an increase in the capital ratios in developed 
economies of 2% may result in GDP contraction of 0.3% in emerging markets with large 
banking flows. 
To evaluate the short term impact on banks' financing costs, volumes, and economic activity 
amongst developed economies who have or are in the process of adopting Basel III, the Macro 
Assessment Group ("MAG") and the Institute for International Finance ("IIF") have each 
undertaken studies to understand their impact. 
The MAG report, which is based on models covering 17 countries, suggests that the median 
increase in lending spreads is estimated at 15 basis points by 2015. This is in response to a 1.0 
percentage point increase in the target capital ratio over a period of four years. Whilst the IIF 
report, which is premised on data from the Eurozone, Japan, and the United States, suggests 
that a 2.0 percentage point increase in banks' capital ratios would result in an increase in the 
average lending spread of 132 basis points over the period 2011-2015. 
As the Accords other prudential requirements, which are not as yet required, are being 
contemplated by banks', banks' have to weigh up the need of being adequately capitalised, 
against the requirement to provide shareholders with a return on their investment. This is of 
critical importance when banks' consider raising new capital in the equity markets, which if 
successful assists banks' in meeting Basel III's regulatory requirements. 
Other ways in which developed market banks' have sought to increase their capital ratios 
entail the comprehensive restructuring of their businesses, however these restructurings have 
the effect of exacerbating reductions in capital deployed to emerging markets17• Other banks', 
considered as better prepared, may have secured lending in the emerging economies in which 
they operate, especially if they were able to secure a higher return in these markets. 
In addition to the changes in capital brought on by Basel III there are other changes to capital 
regulation which also impact emerging markets. This can be seen in the implementation of 
Basel 2.5 which resulted in the deleveraging of banks' trading positions. This adversely 
effected liquidity in emerging markets and the development of their financial markets. 
Financial regulators in developed economies are now developing "bail in tools", such as the 
counter cyclical buffer, ensuring that banks' are easily resolvable in the event of a crisis. 
17 The December 2008 BIS Quarterly Review concluded that "A robust finding is that deterioration in banks' health and stresses in mature interbank markets from the 
early 19905 to mid-200? consistently led to slower growth in international credit to emerging markets." 
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Although these moves have been welcomed, it is important that the impact of these reforms on 
emerging markets be considered. 
In designing and implementing the counter cyclical capital buffer, we need to remain 
cognisant of the variance between the required credit growth in developed and emerging 
markets. Developed markets do not require the same growth rates in the extension of credit 
expected to be seen in emerging markets. In the emerging markets credit and the growth 
therein supports rapid economic growth and social development. With this in mind, growth in 
developed economies may be much lower than the growth rate required in emerging markets 
with lower credit penetration. 
For some time various banks' in emerging markets have conducted their business with more 
equity than banks' in the developed economies. With the implementation of Basel III and the 
requirement for all banks' to hold more capital, and in the context of the relative resilience 
showed by emerging market banks' during the financial crisis, increasing the capital 
requirements for these banks' will further constrain their ability to extend credit, ultimately 
increasing their cost of capital. 
4.3.3. Reduced Availability of Credit Due To Deleveraging 
As a means of meeting higher capital requirements internationally active banks' are forced to 
weigh up their allocation of capital between countries and activities. The concern is that 
regulation that entails mandatory requirements in regard to banks' capital in their home markets 
may lead to a reduction in capital deployed to emerging market countries where these banks' 
have operations. 
Claessens et al (2001) discussed the importance foreign bank entry plays on emerging markets. 
Their paper asserted that the entry of foreign banks' into emerging markets renders national 
banking markets more competitive, forcing domestic banks' to operate more efficiently. The 
results of the paper suggested that the relaxation of regulations pertaining to foreign bank entry, 
whilst a reduction in domestic banks' profit margins will occur, would result in an overall 
positive welfare outcome for the domestic economy. 
The Basel III accord does not directly reduce the entry of foreign banks' into emerging market 
economies, however it can be seen as an impediment, as banks' now choose to increase their 
mandatory capital requirements in their home countries. It therefore goes that a reduction in the 
number of foreign banks' operating in the emerging markets would result in a decrease in the 
competitive environment, increase the profits of domestic banks' and ultimately result in overall 
negative welfare for the domestic economy. 
4.3.4. Fragmentation of Available Finance 
International trade flows, and the growth thereof is imperative for both emerging and 
developed economies. These flows are susceptible to various factors which may adversely 
impact the ability of international banks' to facilitate these flows. Some of these factors 
include: 
• Banks' that have benefited from governments funding, are the subject of political pressure to 
ensure credit is availed primarily in their home markets. 
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• Cross border activity IS being hampered by structural reforms and other regulatory 
disincentives. These cross border impediments significantly hinder financing international 
trade and investment flows. 
• Recovery and resolution plans instituted by the home regulators of internationally active 
banks' may result in an adverse impact on the international banking and emerging markets. 
When developing resolution regimes, home supervisors must collaborate with host supervisors 
to focus on techniques which are aligned with the firm's broader structure. Where strategies 
are not aligned, these international banks' may be forced to shut down, and ultimately 
reducing access to available finance. 
4.4. Impact on Emerging Markets Growth 
This section analyses the effect of the regulatory pressures banks' in emerging markets could 
feed through into the different financing needs and ultimately economic growth. 
4.4.1. Trade and Commodity Finance 
Trade and commodities are some of the primary drivers of economic growth in emerging 
markets. Hence it is a fair assessment to state that trade and commodity finance plays vital role in 
improving the current global economic outlook. Globally trade finance supports USD14 - USD16 
trillion worth of trade annually (The Impact of Regulatory Reforms on Emerging Markets, 2012). 
Given the importance of trade related business in the emerging market it is this form of financing 
that is particularly relevant to emerging markets, given the extent of export related businesses 
and also because of the higher take up of documented trade finance in these markets. 
• Products such as Letters of Credit ("LC's") are more widely used in Asia and emerging 
markets than in the developed economies, LC's are also used by both small and medium 
enterprises ("SME's"), and much larger companies in emerging markets. 
• Over 55% of all LCs originate from emerging markets, thus emphasising the importance of 
trade finance as an important source of credit for these markets. 
This means of financing is considerably important for SME's and smaller corporates, this on the 
back of the relative ease of facilitating, and cheaper means of borrowing when compared to other 
debt products because it is more structured and self-liquidating. These features are of importance 
to SME's, given their higher risk profile would in most cases imply higher capital requirements, 
more expenses for the banks' and additional costs for customers. 
Trade finance has crucial role in supporting real economic activity, this form of financing poses 
minimal risks to financial stability, and was not a contributor to the onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis. Trade finance deals are short term, average tenor of between 90 to 180 days, and have 
very low default rates. 
Given its role in supporting economic growth, limited credit and liquidity characteristics, trade 
finance seems the type of product policymakers should support. This is however not reflected in 
the current Basel III proposal. The combined impact Basel II and III has had on trade finance is 
significant and in the context of the limited risk posed, out of proportion. The April 2011 
Economic Premise, published by the World Bank suggests that while the size of the reduction in 
trade flows remains subject to debate, in the short term there will be an adverse impact on the 
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countries adopting Basel III. To the extent that the short term impacts do materialise, emerging 
markets are expected to be impacted through various channels, these channels are over and above 
the impact these countries would face in the event that they implemented Basel III themselves. 
In light of the disproportionate treatment of the trade finance the IMF, FSB and World Bank task 
force suggested that policymakers make the following changes: 
4.4.1.1. Capital: 
• The waiver of the one year maturity floor for trade loans and receivables, in addition to the 
agreement that there be a harmonised implementation approach. 
• The creation of a trade specific Asset Value Correlation ("A VC") or risk curve in addition to a 
harmonised implementation approach. 
4.4.1.2. Liquidity : 
• The implementation of defined liquidity requirements for LC's and trade guarantees. These 
requirements can be based on data from the International Chamber of Commerce. 
• Recognition of Trade Finance inflows from corporate counterparties at 100%. 
• Basel III recommends that inflows from exposures to Financial Institutions be recognised at 
100% during stress (100% would repay on maturity). From the perspective of corporates the 
accord only recognises 50% of inflows. 
• Given the self-liquidating nature and structural characteristics of trade finance, recognition of 
100% of the inflows from both corporate and financial institutions appears more logical. 
• Capping inflows at 50%, adds a liquidity buffer cost to the business, this exerts undue pressure 
on the viability of export/import financing which may result in banks' contracting - as 
opposed to growing - this driver of economic growth. 
October of 2012 saw the BCBS announcing measures with the objective of improving the capital 
treatment of trade finance. The announcement was, however, disproportional in that only LC's 
for imports to low income countries, and not exports from these low income countries were 
amended. Ultimately these amendments adversely impacts emerging markets as they favour 
exporters from developed economies over emerging market exporters. 
In the event that banks' decided to discontinue the supply of trade finance, the fear is that the this 
financing will move into the scope of the unregulated shadow banking market, worse still it could 
disappear altogether - both unattractive outcomes. Considerable evidence shows that banks' have 
already contracted from this lower margin business 18. 
4.5. Investment and infrastructure and energy 
The emerging markets demand for infrastructure finance vastly outstrips the requirements of 
developed economies. International financial institutions such as banks' playa critical role in 
financing large scale infrastructure projects in emerging markets. 
" According to 2012 data from dialogic trade finance figures were down 18% year-on-year. Activity also fell to 173 deals, down 39% on QI 2011 when 282 deals 
were completed. 
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4.5.1. Most trade and project finance, going from developed markets to emerging markets, 
comes from Europe and Central Asia 
Whilst it is seen as imperative that effective liquidity regulation be implemented, is critical that 
this regulation be mindful of activities such as infrastructure investment. Based on the current 
accord, the liquidity requirements make project finance an even less attractive business 
proposition. Referring particularly to the NSFR, it is likely to mean that it will be more costly to 
initiate project finance. The NSFR rules require banks' to match long-term obligations with long-
term funding which increases the cost drivers of infrastructure finance. There are already signs 
that project finance is starting to decline. 
Though some of the reduction in this form of financing can be blamed on macroeconomic 
developments, at least some of this decline is a direct consequence of increased capital and 
liquidity requirements. If this in fact the case it is likely that infrastructure projects will become 
more difficult to fund, given the increasing cost. This coming at a time when significant 
infrastructure investment is required both in the emerging and developed economies. 
To complicate the situation even further, European banks' will be recommended to del ever, sell 
assets and/or move out of project finance entirely. These recommendations come in the wake of 
the comparatively low margins as they face profitability pressures given their macroeconomic 
circumstances. 
Whether institutional investors could cover the financing gap left by banks' remain unclear. In 
emerging markets, the institutional investment markets are less developed. In general foreign 
investors are more conservative when it comes to investing in illiquid, long-term investments in 
most emerging markets. Few private sector alternatives exist, should banks' pull out. 
4.6. Risk Management 
Basel III features rules which were written with a bias towards the banks' in developed 
economies specifically investment banks'. A case in point is Basel Ill's Credit Valuation 
Adjustments ("CV A") capital charge. 
Given the calculation of CV A it is possible to reduce the CV A charge by hedging with Credit 
Default Swaps ("CDS"). This has two negative impacts for banks in emerging markets: 
4.6.1. Unnecessarily increasing complexity: 
Most developed markets bank hedge out the counterparty credit risk component of a derivative 
transaction, in emerging markets most banks' are often already extending credit to derivative 
counterparties. The CV A approach employs different methodologies for the credit risk for a loan 
and the credit risk of a derivative transaction for the same counterparty. This approach will only 
further complicate risk management. 
Moreover, because CV A is derived from credit spreads, the CV A charge itself is likely to be both 
significantly higher than conventional credit analysis would imply, and considerably more 
volatile, particularly in emerging markets, where liquidity in the underlying instruments is often 
extremely limited. 
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CV A charges penalise lower rated counterparties prevalent in emerging markets. Market analysts 
estimate that for emerging market banks' capital requirements for derivative counterparties will 
increase by 2-4 times. This increases costs and reduces the availability of hedging instruments for 
emerging markets corporates and financial institutions. 
4.6.2. Scarcity of appropriate CDS for CV A hedging 
The CV A capital charge can be minimised by hedging exposure through CDS. However, the 
emerging market faces a scarcity of single name CDS, with the market itself extremely illiquid. 
What single name CDS's are available, these are only available in five year maturity buckets and 
in USD. This makes hedging CV A onerous and difficult. 
CVA imposes substantial costs on non-financial derivative counterparts when transactions are 
not centrally cleared. These costs are not reflective of the limited systemic risk these activities 
pose to the financial system. The CV A capital charge as such imposes unexpectedly high costs 
on corporates and project finance where derivatives are used to manage these risks. 
4.7. Impact on Development of Financial Markets 
Empirical research shows that effective and efficient financial markets are an essential 
requirement of economic growth. Research also shows that deeper financial markets provides 
greater financial stability, lowers governments financing costs and increases financing 
alternatives to facilitate growth. According to the IMF (Enhancing Financial Sector Surveillance 
in Low - Income Countries, 2012) notes that "shallow financial markets tend to increase foreign 
exchange, liquidity management and concentration risks, posing risks for financial stability". It 
adds that "well-developed financial markets and institutions can help dampen the negative impact 
that exchange rate volatility has on firm liquidity and investment capacity." In markets that are 
not developed banks will tend to hold excess liquidity on their balance sheet because they are 
unable to "smooth their intraday liquidity to efficiently manage unexpected financing needs". 
With this in mind it is essential that the reforms aimed at creating deeper financial markets in 
emerging markets is not lost. The following issues should be considered: 
The needs of emerging markets are different. There is a risk that the international regulatory 
reform agenda could divert efforts from equally essential initiatives, such as the development of 
deeper capital markets. These reforms could provide greater financial stability and significant 
economic benefits. 
The increasing fragmentation of international banking will lead to constrained liquidity and 
increased USD credit costs Activities such as trade and project finance, USD denominated, could 
pose particular problems. As a result, local banks' are increasing the use of local currency dollar 
swaps to access borrowing, which could create further risks, or shifts away from the USD for 
such purposes. The development of the local currency bond markets is the best way of reducing 
emerging market dependence on USD funding, thus underscoring the importance of continued 
progress. 
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Diversified banking markets provide benefits from a financial stability perspective both for those 
in home and host countries. There is a risk that deleveraging international banks' will lead to 
local concentration of banking models in emerging markets and for advanced banks' a 
concentration of risk in home markets. This making it more difficult for banks' to cope when 
faced with financial stability risks. The financial crisis highlighted the benefits well managed 
international banks' offer when they injected credit into markets where domestic banks' were 
overburdened. 
It is also imperative to recognize the profound impact the actions of central banks' in the 
developed economies have on the emerging markets. Since the crisis, the balance sheets in the 
developed economies central banks' have increased dramatically, this as a result of quantitative 
easing and the long-term refinancing operations of the European Central Bank. Over the short to 
medium term these have been justified given the objective of securing financial stability in 
developed economies. However, as these operations continue it will be important to consider the 
impact they have on the global financial system, especially emerging markets. 
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5. Conclusion and recommended next steps 
The objective of this literature, cum conceptual, paper sought to discuss and articulate the 
history, rationale and objectives of the Basel Accords. This paper commenced with a brief 
overview of the international banking market during the 1970's, and sought to explain the 
various bank failures which led up to the creation of the BCBS, and thereafter the Basel Capital 
Accords. 
Following the adoption and implementation of the first, Basel I, Accord in 1988, much 
discussion and debate has ensued pertaining to the effectiveness of these Accords. Through these 
discussions, various shortfalls of these Accords have been highlighted which the BCBS has 
sought to address through amendments to these Accords, or on at least two occasions since its 
implementation has resulted in entirely new Accords in the form of Basel II and Basel III. 
The most recent version of these Accords, Basel III, was implemented during the aftermath of the 
2008/2009 global financial crisis. Whilst this Accord sought to improve the quality and quantity 
of banks' capital, thereby fostering a more robust banking sector, detractors of the Accord 
believe that the Accord will adversely impact economic recovery, and growth in emerging 
markets. Subsequently, this paper sought to understand the whether or not multinational banks 
who undertake business in emerging markets are disadvantaged by their requirements to adhere 
to the Basel Accords, and to discuss whether emerging economies, which have adopted the Basel 
framework, experienced any unintended consequences adversely affecting these economies. 
Whilst definitive conclusions, pertaining to the exact impact on economic activity, cannot as yet 
be drawn, this stemming from the fact that current indicators and data does not as yet support 
this, the paper has found that in adhering to the new Accord some multinational banks may 
reduce their businesses and operations in emerging markets as a means of conserving capital. 
Based on the withdrawal of these banks, there will be an impact on the banking landscapes of 
these emerging markets, which inevitably impacts economic activity. These are amongst some of 
the many unintended consequences subsequent to implementation of the Accord .. 
In so far as whether a recommendation to implement the Accord in emerging markets can be 
drawn, it is important that we consider both the positive and negative consequences of the 
Accord. The objective of the Accord, which entails increasing the quality and quantity of bank 
capital, is vital in the creation of a safer and more sustainable banking sector. Whilst the tools for 
creating such a safer banking landscape may result in unintended consequences in the short term, 
it is important that emerging market policy makers consider their long term objectives, and 
whether this Accord will assist in meeting them. To this extent, more work is required on the part 
of policymakers and industry participants to calibrate the impact of these unintended 
consequences and to define appropriate policy responses or amendments. In particular it is 
recommended that: 
A full impact assessment is commissioned to assess the economic impact of the implementation 
of Basel III on emerging markets, both on a country standalone and broader market perspective. 
This should include both the direct effects of these markets seeking to comply with international 
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requirements and the indirect impact via the responses to regulatory change of banks from 
developed markets active in emerging markets. 
Furthermore, this paper also recommends the establishment of a roadmap for change, this 
roadmap should have the goal of creating an internationally consistent and harmonized approach 
to bank regulation. It is important that this take account of the state of banking models in 
developed and emerging economies as well as the financing needs of these economies. Given the 
current reforms and Basel Accords, amendments may well be in order to mitigate unintended 
consequences on emerging markets, and to ensure it fits their needs in both substance and timing. 
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List of Definitions: 
Abbreviation: Definition: 
A-IRB: Advanced Internal Ratings Based 
ASF: Available Stable Funding 
AVe: Asset Value Correlation 
BCBS or the Committee: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
BIS: Bank for International Settlements 
CCP: Central Counterparty 
CDS: Credit Default Swaps 
CVA: Credit Valuation Adjustments 
Default: Failures in the repayment of the loans 
EAD: Exposure at Default 
EBA: Exposure at Default 
ECAI: External Credit Assessment Institutions 
EM: Effective Maturity 
ESRB: European Systemic Risk Board 
EU: European Union 
FIRB: Foundation Internal Ratings-Based 
FSB: Financial Services Board of the United Kingdom 
FSOC: Financial Stability Oversight Council 
G 10 Countries The group of countries that have agreed to participate in the 
General Arrangements to Borrow 
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GHOS: Governors and Heads of Supervision 
ICAAP: Individual Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
IIF: Institute for International Finance 
IOSCO: International Organization of Securities Commissions 
IRB: Internal Ratings Based 
LC: Letters of Credit 
LCR: Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
LGD: Loss Given Default 
MAG: Macro Assessment Group 
NSFR: Net Stable Funding Ratio 
OECD: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTC: Over the Counter 
PD: Probability of Default 
QIS: Quantitative Impact Study 
RSF: Required Stable Funding 
RWA: Risk Weighted Assets 
S&P: Standard & Poor's 
SIFI: Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
SME: Small and Medium Enterprises 
SREP: Supervisory Review Evaluation Process 
UK: United Kingdom 
US or USA: United States of America 
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